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Human Rights (Fed) - Remedy. Matos v. Canada (Attorney General)
In Matos v. Canada (Attorney General) (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal allowed a JR, here against a Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board (FPSLREB) finding against discrimination (here, a 'non-discrimination' right embodied in the collective agreement, not from the CHRA).
Here the court considers the remedy, once discrimination has been found:[73] As noted earlier, paragraph 53(2)(e) of the Canadian Human Rights Act allows the Board to compensate a victim of discrimination "“by an amount not exceeding twenty thousand dollars, for any pain and suffering that the victim experienced as a result of the discriminatory practice”".
[74] In addressing the question of damages for pain and suffering, the Board accepted the CBSA’s contention that Mr. Matos "“experienced no harm, or at the worst very little harm”": at para. 195. The Board went on in the same sentence to say "“I would, in the alternative, if I am mistaken in my finding on the matter of a ""prima facie case of discrimination, award a nominal $1000 under s. 53(2)(e) of the ""CHRA for any pain and suffering that he experienced as a result of the discriminatory practice”".
[75] It is thus clear that the Board’s assessment of the pain and suffering suffered by Mr. Matos was based on its mistaken understanding as to the nature and extent of this harm, and it must be set aside for this reason.
[76] Mr. Matos also asks that he be given an opportunity to reargue his entitlement to special compensation under subsection 53(3) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. It will be recalled that this provision allows the Board to order special compensation in an amount not to exceed $20,000.00 if it finds that the respondent "“has engaged in the discriminatory practice willfully or recklessly”".
[77] The Board refused to make any award to Mr. Matos under this provision, finding that the CBSA had not acted willfully or recklessly. This was a finding that was reasonably open to the Board on the record before it, based as it was on the Board’s appreciation of the nature of the CBSA’s conduct, rather than its understanding of the impact that the conduct had on Mr. Matos. Consequently, I would decline to make such an order.
[78] We were advised at the hearing that the Board member who decided Mr. Matos’ case has since retired. As a result, I would remit Mr. Matos’ case to a different Board member for a reassessment of his entitlement to damages for pain and suffering under paragraph 53(2)(e) of the Act. I would allow the parties to rely on the existing record and/or to lead additional evidence on the damages question, as they see fit.
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