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Human Rights (Ont) - Control of Process. Oulds v. Attorney General of Ontario, et al.
In Oulds v. Attorney General of Ontario, et al. (Div Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR, this against HRTO decisions that "dismissed the complaint on the basis that it did not have jurisdiction as Oulds had failed to establish that her choice not to be vaccinated was based on “creed”".
Here the court considered whether a written hearing was adequate to achieve procedural fairness:[43] Under s. 40 of the Code, the Tribunal has the power to adopt procedures and practices which, in its opinion, "offer the best opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits" of the applications. In choosing to proceed by way of written submissions, the Tribunal was within its statutory authority and was following HRTO procedures, and, specifically, Rules 13.1 and 13.2 of the HRTO Rules of Procedure. This court has determined this process to be procedurally fair: Wu v. Toronto Ombudsman, 2023 ONSC 6192, at paras. 40-41. . Yan v. 30 Forensic Engineering Inc.
In Yan v. 30 Forensic Engineering Inc. (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court reviewed both the administrative/SPPA 'control of process' and evidence jurisdiction, here in an HRTO context:[32] The HRTO has significant power to control its own process: see ss. 25.0.1 and 25.1.(1) of the Statutory Power Procedures Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. s.22 (“SPPA”). It can make rules to govern the practice and procedures before it so as to offer the parties before it, the best opportunity for a fair, just, and expeditious resolution of the merits of an Application: see s. 45.8 of the Code. That authority allows the HRTO to adopt practices and procedures that are an alternative to traditional adjudicative or adversarial procedures. The HRTO is also not bound by the strict rules of evidence; it has a broad discretion to admit relevant evidence, including hearsay, even if that evidence would not be admissible in a court: see s. 15(1) of the SPPA.
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