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Labour (Fed) - Canada Labour Code (3). Juzda v. Canada (Attorney General)
In Juzda v. Canada (Attorney General) (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an applicant's appeal, here from a dismissed JR against "a decision rendered by the Official Delegated by the Head of Compliance and Enforcement (Head) at the Labour Program of Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC)".
The court considers s.128 ['Refusal to work if danger'] and 129 ['Head’s investigation'] of the Canada Labour Code, here where the employee alleged that the employer's COVID precautions "were insufficient to create a safe work environment or to discharge the employer’s obligations under the Code":[1] Mr. Juzda appeals from a judgment of the Federal Court (2025 FC 63) dated January 13, 2025, dismissing his application for judicial review of a decision rendered by the Official Delegated by the Head of Compliance and Enforcement (Head) at the Labour Program of Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). The Head concluded that Mr. Juzda’s refusal to work was frivolous pursuant to paragraph 129(1)(b) of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 and did not require further investigation.
[2] Mr. Juzda’s refusal to work was initiated pursuant to subsections 128(1) and 128(6) of the Code on March 3, 2023. The refusal was based on Mr. Juzda’s continuing concerns regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and followed the implementation by his employer, Elections Canada, of the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) directive requiring government employees to return to work at their office location at least two days per week. Mr. Juzda alleged that COVID-19 was a highly contagious airborne illness that could have long-term effects and that, while his employer’s precautions met the minimum standards set by the TBS, they were insufficient to create a safe work environment or to discharge the employer’s obligations under the Code.
[3] The Employer Report prepared pursuant to subsection 128(7.1) of the Code, and the Employee Workplace Committee Report, prepared pursuant to subsection 128(10.1) of the Code, both concluded that Mr. Juzda’s allegations of danger were without basis. Mr. Juzda maintained his refusal to work, and the matter was referred to the Head pursuant to subsection 128(16) of the Code.
[4] On November 1, 2023, the Head determined that Mr. Juzda’s refusal to work was frivolous in the sense that it lacked legal basis or legal merit, had little prospect of success, or was not serious or reasonably purposeful. The Head found in particular that Mr. Juzda’s concerns regarding his health were speculative and hypothetical, and that he did not consider the control measures his employer put in place, which adhered to governmental safety guidelines and were frequently assessed and communicated to all staff.
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[7] The decision not to investigate a refusal to work pursuant to paragraph 129(1)(b) of the Code involves a broad exercise of discretion in a process that is neither adjudicative nor adversarial in nature and which is intended to screen out work refusals expeditiously (Duiker v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FCA 195 at para. 12; Gupta v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 211 at para. 31; Duiker v. Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FC 701 at paras. 54, 67, 75; Burlacu v. Canada (Attorney General), 2022 FC 1223 at para. 21). As such, one cannot expect the Head to provide as full and as detailed reasons as one would expect from adjudicative tribunals (Goldberg v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FC 1046, at paras. 2, 17, 20, 27-28).
[8] I am also satisfied that the reasons sufficiently grapple with the key concerns raised by Mr. Juzda in his refusal to work. Although it is unfortunate that the Head’s reasons mention only the notion of "“imminent danger”", the failure to refer to the "“serious threat”" posed by a return to the workplace as raised by Mr. Juzda does not render the decision unreasonable. The Head had the benefit of the earlier Workplace Committee Report, which considered Mr. Juzda’s allegations and found that no imminent danger or serious threat had been identified. I also note that Mr. Juzda had not claimed that his workplace was subject to any specific risk greater than the risk elsewhere in the government or society in general. In my view, his refusal to work stemmed more from a disagreement about the adequacy of the policies and safety recommendations adopted by the governmental authorities in response to their assessment of the threat posed by COVID-19, than from an allegation that a "“serious threat”" existed in light of circumstances specific to him or his workplace. . Fearing v. Gardaworld Cash Services Canada Corporation [CLC limitations]
In Fearing v. Gardaworld Cash Services Canada Corporation (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a JR, this against a CIRB ruling that a Labour Affairs Officer was correct when they held "that Mr. Fearing’s complaint for the non-payment of certain wages, made under subsection 251.01(1) of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, was outside the six-month limitation period set out in paragraph 251.01(2)(a) of the Code":[2] In this case, the Board had to make just one factual finding: the date of Mr. Fearing’s complaint. With that finding, it could apply the six-month statutory limitation period and decide whether Mr. Fearing’s complaint was timely.
[3] The Board did exactly that. It found that Mr. Fearing did not make the complaint about unpaid wages for the period of April 8, 2019 to April 17, 2019 until August 22, 2020, well beyond the six-month statutory limitation period in paragraph 251.01(2)(a) of the Code. Mr. Fearing’s complaint was not timely.
[4] The Board also found, reasonably, that there was no statutory basis on which the Board could have extended the limitation period for Mr. Fearing to make the complaint. The clear and unambiguous text of subsection 251.01(3) of the Code confirms that no extension of time was available on these facts.
[5] Mr. Fearing submits that the Board should have granted an extension of time for his wage complaint because it was an ongoing violation of the collective agreement or could have been part of a civil action. His submission is without merit. Under subsection 251.01(3) of the Code, the Board had no power to extend the time for Mr. Fearing to make a subsection 251.01(1) complaint on those grounds.
[6] Overall, the Board identified and applied the relevant statutory provisions, reviewed the evidence before it, considered Mr. Fearing’s arguments, and rendered a decision that was substantiated, rational, logical and supported by the evidence.
[7] The Board considered this matter without an oral hearing. It had the power to do so under section 16.1 of the Code and, given the simplicity of this case, it was justified in doing so. Reviewing this record, we see no other procedural grounds for interfering with the Board’s decision. Mr. Fearing was aware of the case to meet and had a full opportunity to meet it.
[8] In oral argument, Mr. Fearing submits that his complaint was not a wage complaint under the Code but rather was a complaint against a training practice of the employer. This is at odds with the information he provided to the Board on his complaint form and what he wrote in paragraph 8 of his memorandum of fact and law. In our view, it was open to the Board to characterize his complaint as a wage complaint under the Code, one subject to the six-month statutory limitation period in paragraph 251.01(2)(a) of the Code. That characterization was reasonable. . Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Canada (Attorney General)
In Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Canada (Attorney General) (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal comments on the role of the Canada Labour Code:[1] The Canadian Pacific Railway Company is a federally regulated employer. As such, it is required to comply with the provisions of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, including the provisions of Part II of the Code that govern occupational health and safety in federally regulated workplaces. Of particular relevance to this application is subsection 134.1(1) of the Code, found in Part II, that requires CP to establish a Policy Health and Safety Committee (Committee) "“[f]or the purposes of addressing health and safety matters that apply to [CP’s] work, undertaking or business”". . Canada (Attorney General) v. Monette
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Monette (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal allowed a Crown JR, here from a CIRB decision involving the unpaid wage provisions of the Canada Labour Code which the court found 'unreasonableness' for it's lack of thoroughness:[17] Section 251.18 of the Code reads as follows:251.18 Directors of a corporation are jointly and severally liable for wages and other amounts to which an employee is entitled under this Part, to a maximum amount equivalent to six months’ wages, to the extent that
(a) the entitlement arose during the particular director’s incumbency; and
(b) recovery of the amount from the corporation is impossible or unlikely." "
251.18 Les administrateurs d’une personne morale sont, jusqu’à concurrence d’une somme équivalant à six mois de salaire, solidairement responsables du salaire et des autres indemnités auxquels l’employé a droit sous le régime de la présente partie, dans la mesure où la créance de l’employé a pris naissance au cours de leur mandat et à la condition que le recouvrement de la créance auprès de la personne morale soit impossible ou peu probable. [18] Section 154 of the BCA provides as follows:154. Directors of a corporation are solidarily liable to the employees of a corporation for all debts not exceeding six months’ wages payable to each such employee for services performed for the corporation while they are directors of the corporation respectively.
154. Les administrateurs de la société sont solidairement responsables envers ses employés, jusqu’à concurrence de six mois de salaire, pour les services rendus à la société pendant leur administration respective.
However, a director is not liable unless the corporation is sued for the debt within one year after it becomes due and the notice of execution is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part or unless, during that period, a liquidation order is made against the corporation or it becomes bankrupt within the meaning of that expression in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3) and a claim for the debt is filed with the liquidator or the syndic.
Toutefois, leur responsabilité n’est engagée que si la société est poursuivie dans l’année du jour où la dette est devenue exigible et que l’avis d’exécution du jugement obtenu contre elle est rapporté insatisfait en totalité ou en partie ou si la société, pendant cette période, fait l’objet d’une ordonnance de mise en liquidation ou devient faillie au sens de la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité (L.R.C. 1985, c. B-3) et qu’une réclamation de cette dette est déposée auprès du liquidateur ou du syndic. ....
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