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Municipal - Ontario Land Tribunal (OLT) (2). 1353837 Ontario Inc. v. The Corporation of the City of Stratford
In 1353837 Ontario Inc. v. The Corporation of the City of Stratford (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, here brought against a "costs award ... of the Ontario Land Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) under s. 32(2) of the Expropriations Act, R.S.O.1990, c.E.26 (the “Act”)".
Here the court extensively considers the tribunal's costs award, and - interestingly - the [then] adoption (in the tribunal's Rules) of cost aspects of the civil Rules of Civil Procedure [R49]:[22] The relevant portions of the Act that were under consideration are as follows:32 (1) Where the amount to which an owner is entitled upon an expropriation or claim for injurious affection is determined by the Tribunal and the amount awarded by the Tribunal is 85 per cent, or more, of the amount offered by the statutory authority, the Tribunal shall make an order directing the statutory authority to pay the reasonable legal, appraisal and other costs actually incurred by the owner for the purposes of determining the compensation payable, and may fix the costs in a lump sum or may order that the determination of the amount of such costs be referred to an assessment officer who shall assess and allow the costs in accordance with this subsection and the tariffs and rules prescribed under clause 44 (d). 2017, c. 23, Sched. 5, s. 35.
(2) Where the amount to which an owner is entitled upon an expropriation or claim for injurious affection is determined by the Tribunal and the amount awarded by the Tribunal is less than 85 per cent of the amount offered by the statutory authority, the Tribunal may make such order, if any, for the payment of costs as it considers appropriate, and may fix the costs in a lump sum or may order that the determination of the amount of such costs be referred to an assessment officer who shall assess and allow the costs in accordance with the order and the tariffs and rules prescribed under clause 44 (d) in like manner to the assessment of costs awarded on a party and party basis. 2017, c. 23, Sched. 5, s. 35. ....
Standard of Review
[40] Section 31 of the Act provides that an order of the Tribunal may be appealed to this court on a question of law or fact or both.
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[42] As to the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion in ordering costs, the exercise of discretion is not reviewed on a correctness standard and is afforded significant deference: see Shergar at para. 22 and Popack v. Lipszyc (2016), 129 O.R. (3d) 321, [2016] O.J. No. 857, 2016 ONCA 135 (C.A.), at para. 25.
[43] The Court of Appeal in Shergar (decided post-Vavilov) continued to rely on the reasoning set out in Popack which held that discretionary orders under appeal involve balancing of competing interests.In most cases, the existence of a discretion implies that different judges can reasonably arrive at different results. Consequently, appellate courts will defer to the exercise of discretion at first instance absent a clearly identifiable error in the application of the law, a material misrepresentation of the relevant evidence, or a result that is clearly wrong in the sense that it is not defensible on the application of the relevant law to the facts. ... [44] The Court of Appeal in Konig v. Hobza, 2015 ONCA 85 at para. 44 confirmed that the Supreme Court of Canada in Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 1 S.C.R. 303, 2004 SCC 9 at para. 27 made it clear that an appellate court will not interfere with discretionary costs awards generally unless the award reflects an error in principle or is plainly wrong.
[45] Courts have confirmed that it will intervene in costs decisions of other administrative tribunals only if the tribunal made an error in principle or its decision was plainly wrong. Casella v. Ontario College of Chiropodists, 2024 ONSC 899 at para. 27; Kitmitto v. Ontario (Securities Commission), 2024 ONSC 1412 at para. 170; Kennedy v. College of Veterinarians, 2018 ONSC 3603 at para. 24; The Law Society of Upper Canada v. Watson, 2026 ONCA 372 at para.38
[46] 135 submits that the Tribunal’s costs decision is also subject to significant deference by reason of s. 13(4) of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, 2021, S.O., c.4 which provides as follows:13(4) Unless the Tribunal’s failure to comply with the rules, or its exercise of discretion under the rules in a particular manner, causes a substantial wrong that affects the final disposition of the proceeding, neither the failure nor the exercise of discretion is a ground for setting aside a decision of the Tribunal on an application for judicial review or on appeal. [47] The “rules” referred to in s. 13(4) in our view refer to the practice and procedural rules the Tribunal is authorized to implement under s. 13(1) which provides as follows:13(1) The Tribunal may make rules governing its practices and procedures, including rules that,
a) provide for and require the use of hearings or of practices and procedures that are alternatives to traditional adjudicative or adversarial procedures;
b) provided for specified circumstances in which participation in mediation or other dispute resolution processes by parties to a proceeding is mandatory;
c) provide for and require notice to be provided in any particular manner;
d) authorize the Tribunal to combine two or more proceedings or any part of them, or hear two or more proceedings at the same time;
e) authorize a Tribunal to appoint a person from among a class of parties to a proceeding to represent the class where, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the parties have a common interest; or
f) govern the making of orders under section 10 and the exercise of powers under the orders. [48] The Tribunal’s costs award under appeal before this Court was not made in the exercise of its discretion under its practice and procedure rules but rather under s. 32 (2) of the Act, as set out above and therefore s.13(4) does not apply.
[49] Accordingly, I have considered this appeal from the Tribunal’s costs award on the basis of whether the Tribunal made an error in principle or was plainly wrong.
Analysis
[50] The City’s position is that the Tribunal erred in the interpretation and application of Rule 49.10. Rule 49.10 (2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that where a defending party achieves a better result at trial than the amount of its Rule 49 offer, the plaintiff is entitled to its partial indemnity costs to the date of the offer and the defending party is entitled to its costs incurred from the date of the offer forward, unless the court orders otherwise.
[51] The City submits that because the City’s offers to settle exceeded the ultimate compensation award and because of 135’s unreasonable conduct and failure to accept the City’s offers, the Tribunal ought to have awarded the City its costs of the entire proceedings and disentitle 135 to any of its costs.
[52] The City submits that the Tribunal departed from a long line of Rule 49 cases without a principled basis in making what it states was an unprecedented order of costs, which nullifies the effectiveness of Rule 49 offers as a reliable tool to encourage settlement. For the reasons below, I disagree.
[53] The Tribunal, following Shergar, properly recognized the differences between the costs regimes for civil proceedings and expropriation proceedings, balancing the indemnity principle and the efficiency principle as noted above.
[54] Rule 26.29 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure states that if an offer to settle is made and is not dealt with in the Act, the Rules of Civil Procedure apply.
[55] A similar provision was applicable at the time of the Shergar decision under r. 141 of the Ontario Municipal Board Rules.
[56] The City in its factum referred to the jurisprudence dating back to 1976 in Re Rotenberg et al. and Borough of York (No.2) 1976 Canlii 735 (Ont. C.A.) whereby the courts and the Tribunal have applied the costs framework of Rule 49.10 to expropriation cases including awarding costs, usually on a solicitor client basis, to the date of the municipality’s settlement offer.
[57] The facts in Shergar also involved a claimant’s unreasonable conduct in delaying the compensation proceeding and its refusal to accept the City’s offer of compensation that far exceeded the ultimate award made. Similar to the Tribunal decision in Shergar, the Tribunal in this case awarded costs to 135 on a solicitor-client basis until the date of the City’s Rule 49 June 15, 2018, offer in keeping with the jurisprudence under the Act.
[58] The Tribunal in this case noted that the Tribunal in Shergar did not apply Rule 49.10, which would have provided that Shergar receive only partial indemnity costs to the date of the City of Windsor’s Rule 49 settlement offer, and that the City receive its partial indemnity costs from that date forward. That reasoning and decision was upheld by this Court and the Court of Appeal at para. 38. The Tribunal in this case similarly concluded it was entitled to draw upon Rule 49.10 (2) to inform its analysis, but it need not or should not follow it rigidly or formulaically.
[59] This Court in Shergar at paras. 105 and 106 confirmed that the Tribunal’s discretionary authority to award costs under ss. 32(1) and 32(2) is not constrained or fettered in any manner nor does any conflict arise between the terms of these provisions and Rules 49.10 and 57.01.
[60] Accordingly, there was no error in principle in the Tribunal’s award to 135 of its solicitor-client costs up to and including the date of the City’s Rule 49 June 15, 2018, offer nor was that decision plainly wrong.
[61] I come to the same conclusion with respect to the Tribunal’s decision to award 135 its costs on a partial indemnity basis after the date of that offer.
[62] As noted above, the Tribunal’s discretion to make that costs award was not constrained or fettered in any manner. It considered, but in its discretion, departed from the provisions of Rule 49.10, finding that 135 should only be entitled to partial indemnity costs thereafter because of its unreasonable conduct rather than no costs. The Tribunal also ordered that the City was entitled to its costs on a partial indemnity basis for the entire proceeding, not just from its June 15, 2018, settlement offer.
[63] It did so for two reasons. The first was on the basis that 135’s refusal to accept the City’s proper settlement offer of June 15, 2018, and its unreasonable conduct throughout the proceeding were not as egregious as the facts in Shergar such that it should be denied any costs after that date.
[64] That reason should not be considered in isolation. The second and perhaps more significant reason was because the Tribunal found it was more appropriate to address and effectively sanction 135’s unreasonable and wasteful conduct by awarding the City its costs payable by 135 throughout the entire proceeding on a partial indemnity basis and not just from the date of its Rule 49 offer of June 15, 2018.
[65] Rule 49.10 (2) would not normally allow the City its costs before the date of its June 15, 2018, offer. The Tribunal found that it was objectively reasonable for 135 not to accept the City’s first September 11, 2009 offer as it was made jointly to 135 and four other entities, it was unclear and deficient given the mathematical error, and 135’s expert report was extremely critical of the City’s Bower Appraisal including the amount of the cost of remediation being significantly less. In addition, that offer made before the commencement of the expropriation proceeding would not be an offer that falls within this Rule. Scanlan v. Standish, (2001) 2002 CanLII 20549 (ON CA), 57 O.R.(3d) 767, 155 O.A.C. 96 (C.A.).
[66] The second January 13, 2010, offer of the City was not a final offer and was subject to adjustment and reimbursement by 135 if the compensation award was less than the amount advanced. The City’s June 27, 2013, offer was revoked in October 2017.
[67] The City has not established any error in principle or that the Tribunal’s decision was plainly wrong in its finding that 135’s conduct resulting in delays in the expropriation proceedings was less egregious compared to the facts found in Shergar. There was adequate support for those findings on the evidence before it. The Tribunal noted that the initial Vice Chair Jacobs’ decision found that the delays in the proceedings were occasioned by both parties, not just 135, as well as delays beyond the control of either of them or the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that the strong opposing forces of the parties prevented an expeditious conclusion of the lis between them.
[68] The Tribunal recognized at para. 140, as conceded by 135, that all the aggravating factors in Shergar need not be present before costs are not awarded to 135 and/or against it in favour of the City. In my view, the Tribunal did not conclude as the City submitted, that 135 could only be denied costs after the City’s June 15, 2018, offer under Rule 49.10 if the facts were as egregious as those in Shergar.
[69] Rather, what is apparent is that the Tribunal decided it was more appropriate in this case to address 135’s unreasonable conduct by awarding 135 its costs after the June 18, 2018 offer on a reduced partial indemnity basis but at the same time requiring 135 to pay the City’s costs on a partial indemnity basis from the outset until the date of that offer and also thereafter for the balance of the proceeding.
[70] The result in effect required 135’s entitlement to only partial indemnity costs after the date of that offer to be offset to some extent by its obligation to pay the City’s partial indemnity costs incurred before that date because of its unreasonable conduct, neither of which was normally contemplated by Rule 49.10.
[71] Accordingly, the Tribunal did consider the unreasonable conduct of 135 throughout the proceeding including not accepting the City’s Rule 49 offers of June 15, 2018, and April 13, 2021, and, in its discretion, reasonably sanctioned 135 by making the costs order it did.
[72] Lastly, the City did not object to the submissions that the Tribunal had discretion to award costs concurrently to both 135 and the City and on their respective costs motions.
[73] I find the City has not established that the Tribunal’s costs decision falls outside of the range of possible acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect to the facts and law.
[74] The Tribunal in its discretion was entitled, on the evidence before it, to address the issue of 135’s unreasonable conduct when assessing costs under s. 32(2) of the Act by reducing its post June 15, 2018 costs to partial indemnity costs only, and simultaneously requiring 135 to pay the City’s costs throughout the entire proceeding on a partial indemnity basis.
[75] The Tribunal’s decision is to be afforded significant deference even though this Court or other Tribunal members could have reasonably arrived at a different result. I do not find that the discretionary costs award reflects an error in principle or is plainly wrong. . Cytec Canada Inc. v. The Corporation of the City of Niagara Falls
In Cytec Canada Inc. v. The Corporation of the City of Niagara Falls (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, this brought against "the decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal" which "agreed that Cytec was not a “specified person” within the meaning of s. 1 of the Planning Act and precluded it from proceeding" with appeals.
Here the court reviews recent amendments to the Planning Act (by the 'Cutting Red Tape to Build More Homes Act, 2024') regarding appeal standing to the OLT - specifically considering the statutory interpretation text and context assessment of 'specified person' under Planning Act s.1(1) ['Interpretation'], which it finds to be determinative:[1] Land use planning by municipalities can affect many interests in a variety of ways. As a result, the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, creates a mechanism whereby certain parties can appeal some types of municipal planning application decisions, such as zoning by-law amendments and official plan amendments, to the Ontario Land Tribunal. Prior to 2024, appeals of this type could be initiated by anyone who had made oral or written submissions to the municipality prior to the granting of the application. Consequently, appeals of these decisions could be commenced by practically anybody with an interest in the application, regardless of whether their rights were directly affected.
[2] In 2024, the Ontario Government enacted the Cutting Red Tape to Build More Homes Act, 2024, S.O. 2024, c.16 (“CRTA”), which amended the appeal provisions of the Planning Act. Appeals could no longer be commenced by anybody who made submissions to the municipality, but rather only by someone who met the definition of a “specified person” in s. 1 of the Planning Act. As a result, many parties who would have had the right to appeal some types of planning application decisions on the basis that they had made submissions were no longer able to do so.
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(ii) The Three Components of “Specified Person”
[32] The definition of “specified person” in s. 1 of the Planning Act has three components. A “specified person” must be (1) the holder of an ECA to engage in an activity mentioned in s. 9(1) of EPA; (2) the person’s “lands on which the activity is undertaken” must be within an area of employment and be within 300 metres of the area where the planning matter would apply; and (3) the person must intend to appeal the decision in question on the basis of an inconsistency with land use compatibility policy statements issued under s. 3 of the Planning Act. The first and third component are not at issue on this appeal.
(iii) The Meaning of “Activity”
[33] The “activity” which the “specified person” must have an approval to engage in is described in s. 9(1) of the EPA as “use, operate, construct, alter, extend or replace any plant, structure, equipment, apparatus, mechanism or thing that may discharge or from which may be discharged a contaminant into any part of the natural environment other than water” as well as “alter a process or rate of production with the result that a contaminant may be discharged” or which may alter the rate and manner of discharge. To put it simply, the “activity” is the authorized discharge of contaminants into the natural environment other than water.
[34] The appellant submits that the “activity” mentioned in the definition of “specified person” includes not only the discharge of contaminants, but also activities required by the ECA, such as monitoring, testing and identifying and maintaining buffer zones.[5] With respect, this confuses activity which the ECA permits with that which it requires. An ECA permits certain types of activity that results in the discharge of contaminants, and requires other types of activity, such as monitoring and testing.
[35] As noted below, a central focus of the Planning Act is to ensure land use compatibility, which provides further support for the conclusion that the “activity” in question is the discharge of contaminants and not other activities required to comply with the ECA. Proximity between the discharge of contaminants and residential housing raises obvious issues of land use compatibility, which is why the legislature defined “specified person” in terms of the distance (in this case 300 metres) between that activity and the area at issue. The proximity of monitoring, testing and other activities required by the ECA does not raise such issues.
(iv) “Lands on Which the Activity is Undertaken”
[36] If the “activity” is the discharge of contaminants, then the ordinary meaning of “lands on which the activity is undertaken” is the land where the contaminants are discharged. This must be within 300 metres of the area at issue in order to meet the definition of a “specified person.” It is the distance between the location of the contaminant discharge authorized by the ECA and the area at issue which matters.
[37] The Tribunal concluded that since the ECAs authorized Cytec to discharge contaminants at its manufacturing plant at 9061 Garner Road and this was more than 300 metres from the McLeod property, Cytec was not a “specified person” within the meaning of the Planning Act.
[38] Having determined the ordinary meaning of the term in question, the issue that must next be considered is whether a contextual and purposive analysis provides some reason to depart from that meaning. This requires consideration of the legislative intent behind the provision being interpreted.
D. Contextual and Purposive Analysis
i) The Purpose of the Planning Act
[39] As the appellant points out, one of the purposes of the Planning Act as set out in s. 1.1(b) is “to provide for a land use planning system led by provincial policy.” Provincial policy is set out in the Provincial Planning Statement, 2024, OIC 1099/2024 (ON) (“PPC”), which was issued pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Act and s. 3.5 of which provides as follows:3.5 Land Use Compatibility
1. Major facilities and sensitive land uses shall be planned and developed to avoid, or if avoidance is not possible, minimize and mitigate any potential adverse effects from odour, noise and other contaminants, minimize risk to public health and safety, and to ensure the long-term operational and economic viability of major facilities in accordance with provincial guidelines, standards and procedures.
2. Where avoidance is not possible in accordance with policy 3.5.1, planning authorities shall protect the long-term viability of existing or planned industrial, manufacturing or other major facilities that are vulnerable to encroachment by ensuring that the planning and development of proposed adjacent sensitive land uses is only permitted if potential adverse affects to the proposed sensitive land use are minimized and mitigated, and potential impacts to industrial, manufacturing or other major facilities are minimized and mitigated in accordance with provincial guidelines, standards and procedures. [Emphasis in original].[6] [40] The appellant submits that the policy objectives in the PPC of minimizing risks to public health and safety and ensuring the long-term viability of major facilities such as Cytec require that the statutory provision at issue be given a broad and liberal interpretation that best achieves those objectives, which is inconsistent with an unduly narrow interpretation of the terms “lands on which the activity is undertaken.”
(ii) The Purpose of the Amendment
[41] While the appellant’s argument holds some attraction, in my view its flaw is that while it considers some of the relevant context, it does not do so broadly enough. The definition of a “specified person” is the result of a statutory amendment. While minimizing risks to public safety and ensuring the long-term viability of major facilities are undoubtedly legislative objectives of the Planning Act, the statutory interpretation issue that arises in this case requires a consideration of the objectives of the amendment, that is, why the legislature has chosen to attempt to achieve its objectives by limiting those who can appeal planning decisions to “specified persons” rather than the wider category that existed before the amendments.
[42] As noted earlier, the CRTA must be interpreted as being remedial, which requires that the mischief it was intended to remedy be identified. As its name suggests, one of the primary objectives of the Cutting Red Tape to Build More Homes Act is to accelerate the construction of residential housing by reducing “red tape.” The CRTA’s preamble states that “unnecessary red tape too often delays shovels from getting in the ground” and that one of the measures the government intends to use to remedy this is “streamlining municipal approvals.” A preamble is an integral part of a statute and intrinsic evidence of its purpose: R. v. Kloubakov, 2025 SCC 25, 505 D.L.R. (4th) 197, at para. 70; Reference re An Act Respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, 2024 SCC 5, 488 D.L.R. (4th) 189, at para 39; References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 175, at para. 51.
[43] How amending the definition of “specified person” achieves the objective of “cutting red tape” and accelerating the construction of residential housing can be determined by considering the law as it existed prior to the amendment in order to discern what it was that the legislature intended to change: M. v. H., 1999 CanLII 686 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 323. Prior to the amendment, virtually anybody who took an interest in certain types of planning instruments could appeal their approval by a municipality. After the amendment, the category of people who could launch such an appeal was significantly circumscribed. Clearly, the purpose of the amendment was to reduce the number of appeals of planning approvals by restricting rights of appeal, as the Tribunal concluded. This would obviously have the effect of “streamlining municipal approvals.”
[44] It is clear from the foregoing that the amendments were designed to balance the objectives of the Planning Act with the objective of accelerating the construction of residential housing. The flaw in the appellant’s argument is that it considers only the former objective. A purposive and contextual analysis requires that both be considered.
(iii) The Amendment Was Not Intended to Expand Appeal Rights
[45] The appellant submits that the purpose of the amendment was not to restrict appeal rights, but rather to expand them. This submission is based on earlier versions of Bill 185 and comments made when the bill was being debated in the legislature. The version of Bill 185 introduced at first reading restricted the definition of “specified person” to include only utility companies, telecommunications operators and railways. However, the bill was amended such that the definition was broadened to include the current categories of “specified persons.” At third reading, the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing said:So the bill has taken a step in the right direction by limiting third-party appeals, while at the same time amendments were brought in that allow us to preserve the rights of landowners to appeal amendments that may be made that disadvantage them, Mr. Speaker. This is something we heard from individual landowners, and we made that move in committee to address that challenge.[7] [46] The appellant submits that because the category of people who had rights of appeal was narrower at first reading than it was in the final version, the purpose of the amendment was to “preserve (or expand) appeal rights for major industries, but only on the grounds of inconsistency with land use compatibility policies in the PPS.”[8]
[47] With respect, comparing earlier versions of the bill with the final version is of little assistance in discerning legislative intent in this case. It seems that at one point, the legislature considered restricting appeal rights much more than it eventually did, but this does not change the fact that the legislature intended that far fewer people have a right of appeal than was the case before the Planning Act was amended. This is evident from what the Minister said immediately following what was relied on by the appellant:
The move of limiting third-party appeals, in and of itself, will unleash some 67,000 applications that are stalled before the board right now, and that will make a huge difference in helping us get shovels in the ground faster.[9]
(iv) Restricting Appeal Rights to Those With a Direct Interest
[48] An examination of the various categories of “specified person” in s. 1 of the Planning Act makes it clear that appeal rights have been restricted for the most part to those whose activities create immediate and obvious land use compatibility issues and who are directly affected by the planning instrument in question, rather than those who merely have an interest in it or who could be affected at some time in the future.
[49] Some of the categories include various types of utility companies operating in the municipality or planning area, such as electric, gas, oil and telecommunications (subsections (a), (d), (e) and (h)) and some specific public agencies, such as Ontario Power Generation, Hydro One and NAV Canada (subsections (b), (c) and (i)).
[50] The rest of the categories are all defined in terms of certain activities and the proximity of the activity to the area to which the planning decision applies. They include a company operating a railway line within 300 metres of the area (subsection (g)), the operator of an airport which affects the use of land within the area (subsection (j)), those licenced to engage in certain excavation activities within 300 metres of the area (subsection (k)), and those engaged in activities regulated under the EPA where those activities are undertaken within 300 metres (subsections (l) and (m)).
[51] In this case, the appellant engages in one of the types of the activities that are listed, but does not do so within the required proximity of 300 metres. While it does own land within 300 metres, the land is vacant and not used for any of the enumerated activities. It is difficult to see how the fact that Cytec happens to own vacant land near the area in question raises the type of immediate and obvious land use compatibility issue that is required to create a right of appeal.
[52] During oral argument, counsel for the appellant submitted that the expansive definition of “specified person” the appellant urges this court to adopt would “save lives” because it allows Cytec to have some say in whether there is a residential development close to the location where it produces hazardous chemicals. However, if Cytec had never acquired the Beechwood lands, it would clearly not be a “specified person” even though its operations would be no less hazardous.
[53] The untenability of the appellant’s position is evident if one considers a hypothetical situation in which the Beechwood lands were far larger than they are and Cytec owned vacant and unused land that was 100 kilometres in length between the manufacturing plant and the McLeod property. As counsel acknowledged in oral argument, on the appellant’s interpretation of the definition of a “specified person,” Cytec would have a right of appeal in these circumstances, even though the hazardous activity it engaged in was over 100 kilometres from the proposed subdivision.
[54] It follows from the foregoing that the reason Cytec does not meet the definition of a “specified person” has nothing to do with the fact that its property comprises several distinct parcels of land, as the appellant submits.[10] As explained, it is the location of the lands where the activity in question, the discharge of contaminants, takes place that matters, not the location of other property which may belong to the same owner. Whether Cytec’s property consists of one parcel or several is of no moment.
(v) Conclusion
[55] It is evident from the foregoing that that a purposive and contextual analysis does not provide any reason to depart from the ordinary meaning of the definition of “specified person.” The Tribunal was correct in concluding that the ordinary meaning of the provision was consistent with the purpose of the legislation and the context in which it was enacted.
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