Simon's Megalomaniacal Legal Resources

Statutes and Regulations - Interpretation Act (Fed)

. Canada (Attorney General) v. Canadian Civil Liberties Association

In Canada (Attorney General) v. Canadian Civil Liberties Association (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a federal AG JR, this brought against "the Federal Court’s finding that the declaration of a public order emergency was unreasonable and that some provisions of the Regulations and of the Economic Order violated the Charter", here where the emergency order was made under the federal Emergencies Act.

Here the court considers IA s.33(2) ['Number']:

[281] The AGC also contends, focusing on the use of the singular "“province”" in the definition of "“national emergency”" in section 3 of the Act, that the critical issue to be determined is "“whether the emergency extends beyond provincial borders, preventing any one province from resolving the entire crisis, or at least one province having indicated the emergency is beyond its capacity or authority, such that the provinces collectively are unable to resolve the crisis”". Such an argument, in our respectful opinion, cannot be sustained.

[282] First of all, this argument is inconsistent with subsection 33(2) of the Interpretation Act, which provides that words in the singular include the plural. This is borne out by the French version of the Act, which refers to "“la capacité ou [les] pouvoirs d’intervention des provinces”" (emphasis added). At the end of the day, whether an urgent and critical situation has reached the level of a national emergency is not a purely mathematical exercise; it must rest on an assessment of the nature and intensity of the facts and situation at hand.

. Canada (Attorney General) v. Responsible Plastic Use Coalition

In Canada (Attorney General) v. Responsible Plastic Use Coalition (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, this brought against a successful industry-brought JR against "the GIC’s [SS: Governor in Council's] order and the Minister’s [SS: of the Environment and Climate Change] decision to not constitute a" Board of Review respecting the CEPA listing of plastics as a toxic.

The court considers whether plastics are a 'substance', here within the meaning of CEPA s.3(1) ["Interpretation - Definitions"]:

III. Whether PMI are a "“substance”" within the definition of section 3

[54] The GIC’s determination that PMI are a "“substance”" within the meaning of paragraph 3(1)(f) was reasonable having regard to the text, context and purpose of CEPA.

[55] The Federal Court accepted the argument that, as "“plastic manufactured items”" is plural and the English version of paragraph 3(1)(f) references "“any manufactured item”" in the singular, PMI do not fit under the definition of "“substance”" since the term "“substance”" itself is singular. This led the Court to conclude that PMI as a category was broader than the definition of "“substance”" provided at paragraph 3(1)(f) of CEPA (Federal Court Decision, at para. 80).

[56] I do not agree.

[57] While "“""substance”" is defined in the singular in section 3 of the English version of CEPA to include "“any manufactured item,”" subsection 33(2) of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21 provides that "“[w]ords in the singular include the plural, and words in the plural include the singular.”" This basic rule of statutory interpretation stipulates that "“substance”" includes "“substances”" and "“item”" includes "“items.”" PMI fall within the definition of "“substance”" as the singular necessarily encompasses the plural and the plural the singular.

[58] This conclusion is reinforced by the French version of the statute, which speaks in the plural—"“""les articles manufacturés”" at paragraph 3(1)(f). The search for the common meaning between the two official language articulations, when guided by the Interpretation Act, leads to the conclusion that PMI readily fall within the ambit of "“substance”" (Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 841, 1998 CanLII 828; Chrysler Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Competition Tribunal), 1992 CanLII 68 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 394 at p.432 per McLachlin J., dissenting but not on this point).

[59] While the past practices of a decision maker are not determinative of reasonableness, they can be instructive (Canada v. Honey Fashions Ltd., 2020 FCA 64 at para. 38). A review of other substances listed on Schedule 1 supports the interpretation that the plural description of an item necessarily includes a singular iteration of the same substance. Numerous other items are listed in the plural on Schedule 1 including, for example, "“plastic microbeads,”" "“inorganic fluorides,”" and "“inorganic arsenic compounds.”"

[60] While this is sufficient to dispense with the matter, I note that this textual reading also aligns with a contextual and purposive understanding of subsection 3(1).

[61] With respect to context, PMI are also "“matter”" within the ambit of paragraph 3(1)(a). While "“matter”" is not defined in CEPA, its ordinary definition is wide and can include "“the substance of which a physical object is composed,”" "“a material substance that occupies space and has mass”" and "“a material substance of a particular kind or for a particular purpose”" (see Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionary / Merriam Webster definition of "“matter”").

[62] With respect to purpose, the objective of section 90(1) is to enable a threshold survey of numerous, diverse candidate substances for toxicity and potential regulation (Hydro-Québec, at paras. 146–147). To this end, it provides for the review of substances that pre-exist in Canada or are new, are living or inanimate; indeed, it expressly includes "“any distinguishable kind of…matter”" (CEPA, s. 3(1)). This aligns with the objective of enabling the detection of substances that may cause harm to health or the environment before it occurs. Given CEPA’s pollution prevention purpose, PMI fits comfortably within the definition of "“substance,”" particularly given that the RIAS’ definition of PMI mirrors paragraph 3(1)(f), except for its plurality:

any items made of plastic formed into a specific physical shape or design during manufacture, and have, for their intended use, a function or functions dependent in whole or in part on their shape or design.

[RIAS, Appeal Book, at 788 (emphasis added).]

[63] To conclude, the GIC’s finding that PMI are a "“substance”" falls squarely within the relevant constraints of the Act and aligns with the norms of statutory interpretation (Auer, at paras. 37, 39). The narrow, limited and overly technical reading accepted by the Federal Court does not.

. Prince Edward Island Potato Board v. Canada (Agriculture and Agri-Food)

In Prince Edward Island Potato Board v. Canada (Agriculture and Agri-Food) (Fed CA, 2024) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from an earlier dismissed JR, here against "an [SS: Ministerial] Order issued by the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food [Minister] under section 15(3) of the Plant Protection Act, SC 1990, c 22, declaring the entire province of Prince Edward Island [PEI] as "“a place infested with potato wart”" and prohibiting the movement of PEI seed potatoes from PEI without written authorization from an inspector [Ministerial Order]".

Here the court considers an aspect of the federal Interpretation Act, which renders local statute interpretation provisions generally applicable to "all other enactments relating to the same subject-matter unless a contrary intention appears" [IA s.15(2)(b)]:

[50] Before the Federal Court and on this appeal, the parties agreed that the term "“infested”" in section 15(3) of the Act takes its meaning from the definition set out at section 2 of the Regulations, which imports the application of the reasonable suspicion standard. Before this Court, the Appellant submitted that this follows from paragraph 15(2)(b) of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, which states that an interpretation section contained in an enactment, defined in subsection 2(1) of that Act as including an act or regulation or any portion thereof, is to be read and construed "“as being applicable to all other enactments relating to the same subject-matter unless a contrary intention appears.”" The Federal Court adopted the parties’ agreement as the basis for its analysis of the reasonableness of the Ministerial Order.