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Statutes and Regulations - Exclusive Jurisdiction. Resler v. Anglin
In Resler v. Anglin (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed a defendant's SCC appeal, this brought against an Alberta CA ruling that allowed an appeal where the Alberta QB struck the plaintiff's "amended statement of claim in its entirety, finding that it amounted to an abuse of process, disclosed no reasonable cause of action and, in any case, the allegations had no reasonable chance of success given Resler’s common law and statutory immunities".
Here the court considers the determination of 'exclusive jurisdiction', here of an Alberta election statute:[63] A contextual and purposive analysis also supports the conclusion that the Election Act does not bar civil claims for acts performed in bad faith. Regarding context, the scheme of the Election Act does not impliedly exclude Anglin’s claim. Anglin noted that the Ontario Court of Appeal identified three factors that courts should consider in determining whether a civil claim is impliedly excluded by statute:(i) whether the “process for dispute resolution established by the legislation” is “consistent with exclusive jurisdiction”;
(ii) the “nature of the dispute” and the “extent to which the court’s assumption of jurisdiction would be consistent or inconsistent with that scheme”; and
(iii) “the capacity of the scheme to afford effective redress” on the basis that “where there is a right there [ought to be] a remedy.”
(R.F., at para. 75, citing Hopkins v. Kay, 2015 ONCA 112, 124 O.R. (3d) 481, at paras. 31-33 (emphasis deleted).) [64] With respect to the first consideration, Anglin made three points. First, the controverted elections provisions of the Election Act only allow “the candidate whose election is challenged” to be named as a respondent in the petition challenging the election results (s. 186(2)). The amended statement of claim is not against the person who won the election nor against any other candidates. Second, the petition contesting the election must be filed within 30 days of the election (s. 185(2)(b)). The amended statement of claim included conduct that occurred well after 30 days post-election. Third, while the controverted elections provisions ultimately require the determination of the issue to be made by a judge, the CEO is an integral part of the process of implementing the judge’s decision (s. 195(1)). This would have the effect of putting Resler in charge of implementing the judge’s decision.
[65] With respect to the second consideration, Anglin noted that as regards the nature of the dispute, the controverted elections provisions do not contemplate the nature of his personal claim nor does he seek to overturn the election results. The controverted elections provisions only contemplate a determination of who should be recognized as winning the election, which is not in issue. Anglin’s claim therefore does not fit within the procedural framework of the Election Act as his claim for damages is not against the candidate who won the seat. As Anglin noted, if he is limited to a public remedy, then there is no personal accountability whatsoever for individuals who commit torts against candidates.
[66] With respect to the third consideration, Anglin noted that the controverted elections provisions “would shift Resler’s personal liability for his actions to a process that provides no remedy whatsoever” (R.F., at para. 82).
[67] I find Anglin’s arguments addressing the considerations set out in Hopkins to be compelling. The controverted elections provisions of the Election Act are neither designed nor suited to address individual harms alleged to have been committed by or on behalf of a CEO during the election process.
[68] The Election Act also only contemplates one remedy — a declaration that the election is void by reason of the “undue return or undue election of a candidate” as the MLA (s. 185(1)). That is the only jurisdiction carved out for the courts to remedy alleged defects in the conduct of an election. However, if the only possible remedial action was through the mechanism of a controverted election, it would not make sense for s. 5.1(1) to grant the CEO specific immunity for his actions as an individual public officer.
[69] Turning to the purpose of s. 5.1(1), if a civil claim does not challenge the validity of the election, leaving room for it strengthens the accountability of public officers and provides relief for victims of tortious conduct. This is a logical basis for the Election Act’s silence on bad faith actions and its express immunity for the CEO’s good faith actions.
[70] I find that, based on the text, context and purpose of s. 5.1(1), Anglin is entitled to claim a personal remedy based on his allegations of bad faith and tortious conduct, the usual remedy for which is damages, including punitive damages where warranted. I note that the Chief Electoral Officer of Quebec, an intervener in this appeal, recognized that, in principle, an election officer is not prevented from being pursued in civil proceedings for bad faith or gross negligence if it caused real prejudice to the claimant:[translation] . . . subject to their relative immunity for any act or omission in good faith in the performance of their duties, an election administrator may in principle be the subject of a civil suit for bad faith or gross negligence if this could have caused actual harm to the plaintiff, for example an injury or other material damage.
(Chief Electoral Officer of Quebec’s condensed book, at p. 2) I agree.
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