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. Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Canada
In Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Canada (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, this brought against a Tax Court ruling that Aeroplan miles "are not gift certificates within the meaning of section 181.2" of the Excise Tax Act.
Here the court considers the statutory interpretation doctrine of 'absurdity':D. Concluding that Miles are not gift certificates does not lead to absurd results
[46] The likely effects or results of rival statutory interpretations can be used to test which interpretation accords best with the legislative text, context and purpose: Williams v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 FCA 252 at para. 52; see also, Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes at § 10.01[2], [3] and cases cited therein.
[47] The Bank says that if Miles are not gift certificates, then they fall within the broad definition of "“coupons”", and that this leads to absurd results. In support of its argument, the Bank provides five examples.
[48] Three examples involve situations where the Bank pays GST for the right to allocate Miles, and the cardholder either (1) uses the Miles to acquire a gift card and pays GST on the taxable purchase that they make using the gift card; (2) uses the Miles to purchase an international flight which attracts GST at a rate of zero; or (3) does not redeem the Miles. The Bank says that example (1) results in double taxation, example (2) results in the Bank paying tax at the wrong rate, and example (3) results in the Bank paying tax on "“phantom supplies”".
[49] With respect, these examples do not support a conclusion of absurdity.
[50] Rather, these three examples illustrate that, because of its financial institution status, the Bank is not entitled to claim input tax credits for the GST it pays. If the Bank was not a financial institution, it would recuperate the GST and there would be no double taxation, no difference in tax rates, and no tax on "“phantom supplies”" in the examples given above. However, the Bank is generally not entitled to input tax credits as a result of Parliament’s deliberate policy choice. That choice reflects the fact that most of the Bank’s supplies are financial services that do not attract GST: ss. 123(1) (definitions of "“commercial activity”", "“exempt supply”", and "“taxable supply”"), 165(1), 169(1), Schedule V of the Excise Tax Act; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (T.C.C.) at para. 76. In my view, this policy choice does not lead to absurd results. . Caruso v. Law Society of Ontario
In Caruso v. Law Society of Ontario (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, here brought against the dismissal of an application "for declarations that “licensed paralegals in Ontario are authorized to provide immigration legal services in accordance with section 91(2) of [IRPA], including assisting clients in preparing and completing applications under [IRPA] and any of [its] associated Regulations”.
Here the court considers the statutory interpretation principle against 'absurdity', which it here seems to equate with 'arbitrariness':[68] Although Mr. Caruso did not argue explicitly that the foregoing arbitrariness arguments support the application of the presumption against absurd interpretations, I will consider them in this context. I will do so because an arbitrary interpretation would almost certainly be an absurd one. Moreover, the arbitrariness arguments that Mr. Caruso featured before us would not otherwise be material in this appeal, given that leave was granted only on the interpretation issue, and not on the division of powers issue, the Charter issue, or other arguments about the rationality of legislative policy.
....
[70] First, the presumption against absurd interpretation is a secondary rule of interpretation that applies only in cases of ambiguity. Where a provision is not ambiguous, the legislature’s intention “must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be”: R. v. McIntosh, 1995 CanLII 124 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686, at para. 34. A genuine ambiguity arises only where there are “two or more plausible readings, each equally in accordance with the intentions of the statute” (emphasis omitted): Bell ExpressVu, at para. 29. In my view, when By-Law 4 is read according to the grammatical and ordinary meaning of its words in the context of the legislation as a whole and its purpose (the “intentions of the statute”), the by-law is not ambiguous. There is no reasonable interpretation of By-Law 4 that would support paralegal authority to engage in non-adjudicative legal work. The only reasonable interpretation it bears is the one that the Divisional Court arrived at, leaving no room to consider the presumption against arbitrariness.
[71] Second, even if this secondary rule of interpretation was applied, there is nothing arbitrary about the interpretation that the Divisional Court gave to By-Law 4. Limiting the authority of licensed paralegals to doing only advocacy work including the preparation of documentation linked to that work has a long history and is supported by the access to justice rationale, the oversight rationale, and the pragmatic rationale described above in para. 57.
[72] As for the manner in which the LSO is implementing that distinction in different areas of the law, that is immaterial to the interpretation of By-Law 4.[11] . Canada v. Independent Order of Foresters
In Canada v. Independent Order of Foresters (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal allowed a Crown appeal, this involving the taxation of "life insurance and accident and sickness insurance (accident insurance)" operated by a fraternal benefit society (which themselves are tax-exempt under the ITA).
Here the court considers the statutory interpretation doctrine against 'absurdity':[66] When interpreting a legislative provision, we must consider the presumption that Parliament does not intend unjust, inequitable or absurd results: Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, 1995 CanLII 112 (S.C.C.) at para. 65; Gitxaala Nation v. Canada, 2016 FCA 187 at para. 162. . Pepa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [and arbitrariness]
In Pepa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed an appeal, this from a Federal Court of Appeal decision (that from a judicial review at the Federal Court) that held that "it was reasonable for the IAD ['Immigration Appeal Division'] to have found that “it does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal pursuant to subsection 63(2) [SS: 'Right to appeal — visa and removal order'] of the [IRPA] if the permanent resident visa is expired at the time the removal order is issued”.Note: IRPA 63(2) provides that a "foreign national who holds a permanent resident visa may appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division against a decision to make a removal order against them made under subsection 44(2) or made at an admissibility hearing". Here the court considers the 'absurdity' principle of statutory interpretation:[102] It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences (Rizzo, at para. 27). An interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, if it is incompatible with other provisions, or if it defeats the purpose of the statute or renders some aspect of it pointless or futile (para. 27). On a robust review, it is not reasonable to conclude, without clear wording or a compelling justification, that Parliament intended that a person could lose their right to appeal before any hearing on the merits took place and before any removal order was issued. The burden of justification to establish that Parliament wanted a person to lose their right of appeal due to scheduling delays or as a result of the normal timeline of further examinations extending beyond the visa’s expiry date would be very high. There is no solid evidence or sound argument upon which to rest the finding that Parliament intended such absurd consequences. In fact, Parliament explicitly excised language from the old provision requiring a person to hold a valid visa at the time a report was made, and instead omitted any reference to a point in time in the new IRPA. The IAD reasons rest on the absurd premise that Parliament enacted the IRPA to include a facially and fatally flawed safeguard: an express appeal right that can commonly be lost before any decision that could be appealed is taken. With respect, that is not a reasonable reading or result. As was the case in Mason, at para. 98, the IAD failed to address the absurd consequences of its interpretation.
[103] The prospect of absurd consequences is also compounded by potential arbitrariness associated with the expiration of a person’s visa. The issuance of a permanent resident visa to a foreign national takes place as a result of an assessment of that person’s eligibility, and the expiry date of the visa is linked to this assessment: a permanent resident visa is issued for a period not exceeding one year, and the expiry date is tied to the earliest expiry date of the applicant’s passport or medical documentation.
[104] In this case, Ms. Pepa’s medical examination documentation had a “valid to” date of September 16, 2018, while her Albanian passport would not expire until several years later. As such, the date of expiry on her visa was the earlier of the two: September 16, 2018.
[105] The IAD’s interpretation arbitrarily ties a person’s right of appeal to the date of expiry on a passport, or the date of expiry on medical documentation, to a maximum cap of one year. On their face, neither of those dates can be rationally connected to a right of appeal. Thus, the absurdity is compounded by arbitrariness.
[106] Given the legislative history, absurd consequences, and inherent arbitrariness of the visa’s expiration date, the intention of Parliament cannot have been for individuals like Ms. Pepa to lose their right of appeal before the issuance of a removal order. It cannot be assumed that Parliament repealed the predecessor provision to enact a futility, as the IAD’s interpretation suggests. The IRPA is a comprehensive piece of legislation with a sequence of remedies in place, and Parliament must have intended those remedies to have a purpose and be efficacious. To find otherwise would require the clearest of statutory language to the contrary, which s. 63(2) does not contain. . Telus Communications Inc. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities
In Telus Communications Inc. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal, here from a Federal Court of Appeal dismissal, that from a CRTC ruling that it did not have jurisdiction "to adjudicate disputes over access to 5G small cell antennas situated on public property" under the 'access regime' for telecommunications carriers.
Here the court considers the 'absurdity' principle of statutory interpretation:(5) Absurd Consequences
[75] Finally, the carriers argue that a narrow interpretation of “transmission line” leads to the absurd result that the wireline equipment in a mobile wireless network (the cable) is covered by the access regime while other, necessary, equipment (the antenna) is not. Quebecor and Videotron submit that because it is impossible to operate 5G transmission lines without small cell antennas, the same access rights should apply to the entire network, i.e., to both the cables and the antennas. Likewise, Rogers submits that Parliament could not have intended to grant carriers a right of access to deploy the cables that connect to 5G small cell antennas, but not the antennas themselves.
[76] The consequences of a particular interpretation are a component of the modern approach to statutory interpretation. Consequences that are consistent with the purpose and scheme of the legislation are presumed to have been intended. Conversely, consequences that are absurd or otherwise unacceptable are presumed not to have been intended (Rizzo, at para. 27; Wang v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2023 BCCA 101, 480 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at paras. 42-43; see also R. Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation in a New Nutshell” (2003), 82 Can. Bar Rev. 51, at p. 64).
[77] I agree with the carriers that an access regime that applies to wireline equipment in a mobile wireless telecommunications network but not wireless equipment is not the regime most favourable to the deployment of 5G infrastructure, a regime that Parliament could have enacted. It will require them to negotiate with municipalities without recourse to the CRTC. That said, this does not mean the narrower interpretation leads to an absurd result; it is not unreasonable, illogical, incompatible with other provisions of the Act, does not defeat the purpose of the Act, nor does it render any part of the Act pointless or futile (Rizzo, at para. 27).
[78] I am not persuaded that a narrow interpretation of “transmission line” is likely to lead to an absurd consequence of impeding the Act’s overall objectives. There was evidence before the CRTC that delays in accessing public property could run up to two years. But the CRTC found that municipalities or other public authorities have not “systematically” interfered with the deployment of 5G infrastructure (CRTC Decision, at para. 475). This factual finding is entitled to deference. The carriers have failed to establish that regulating access to the wireline and wireless equipment in a network differently would frustrate the orderly deployment of the carriers’ telecommunications infrastructure — 5G or otherwise — across Canada.
[79] Further, in my view, there is no absurdity in the fact that some equipment, such as wire or cables, are subject to the access regime but other equipment, such as antennas are not. As I earlier noted, antennas have specific impacts and risks that are not engaged when carriers install, maintain and operate wires or cables. The access regime, by contrast, has clearly been designed with linear infrastructure in mind. As a result, subjecting all connected infrastructure, including 5G small cell antennas or previous-generation large cell antenna towers to the access regime without regard for these impacts and risks could give rise to concerns about unintended consequences. The same is true even if I draw a distinction between 5G small cell antennas and large cell antennas — they have many of the same impacts and risks, such as frequency interference, exposure safety, etc. . Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue)
In Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue) (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an insolvency appeal, here involving "when a bankrupt is released from their government student loan debts under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act".
Here the court considers the statutory interpretation principle of 'absurdity':[98] Courts should interpret legislation under the presumption that a legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences. An interpretation of a statutory provision produces absurd consequences if, for example, it frustrates the purpose of the legislation; creates irrational distinctions; leads to ridiculous or futile consequences; is extremely unreasonable or unfair; leads to incoherence, contradiction, anomaly, or disproportionate or pointless hardship; undermines the efficient administration of justice; or violates established legal norms such as the rule of law (Rizzo, at para. 27; La Presse, at para. 54; R. v. Basque, 2023 SCC 18, at para. 73; Downes, at para. 51; Sullivan, at §§ 10.02-10.03; Côté and Devinat, at paras. 1514-19). . BNSF Railway Company v. Greater Vancouver Water District
In BNSF Railway Company v. Greater Vancouver Water District (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal [under the Canada Transportation Act, s.41(1)], here from a CTA decision that "found the rerouting works suitable and authorized the District to construct and maintain them at the District’s cost".
Here the court considers the statutory interpretation role of 'absurdity':[133] When legislation is open to more than one interpretation, an interpretation that leads to negative consequences or an absurd result should be rejected: Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., 1995 CanLII 112 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, 24 O.R. (3d) 454 at 1081-1082; Rizzo at para. 27; Porter v. Boucher-Chicago, 2021 FCA 102 at para. 41. An interpretation that is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, illogical or incoherent, or incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment can be absurd: Rizzo at para. 27. . Aviva Insurance Company of Canada v. Danay Suarez
In Aviva Insurance Company of Canada v. Danay Suarez (Div Ct, 2021) the Divisional Court quotes from the leading statutory interpretation case of Rizzo on absurdity:[33] In Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), Iacobucci, J. noted:It is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences. According to Côté, supra, an interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, or if it is incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment (at pp. 378-80). Sullivan echoes these comments noting that a label of absurdity can be attached to interpretations which defeat the purpose of a statute or render some aspect of it pointless or futile (Sullivan, Construction of Statutes, supra, at p. 88). (para. 27)
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