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Statutory Interpretation - Absurdity. Telus Communications Inc. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities
In Telus Communications Inc. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal, here from a Federal Court of Appeal dismissal, that from a CRTC ruling that it did not have jurisdiction "to adjudicate disputes over access to 5G small cell antennas situated on public property" under the 'access regime' for telecommunications carriers.
Here the court considers the 'absurdity' principle of statutory interpretation:(5) Absurd Consequences
[75] Finally, the carriers argue that a narrow interpretation of “transmission line” leads to the absurd result that the wireline equipment in a mobile wireless network (the cable) is covered by the access regime while other, necessary, equipment (the antenna) is not. Quebecor and Videotron submit that because it is impossible to operate 5G transmission lines without small cell antennas, the same access rights should apply to the entire network, i.e., to both the cables and the antennas. Likewise, Rogers submits that Parliament could not have intended to grant carriers a right of access to deploy the cables that connect to 5G small cell antennas, but not the antennas themselves.
[76] The consequences of a particular interpretation are a component of the modern approach to statutory interpretation. Consequences that are consistent with the purpose and scheme of the legislation are presumed to have been intended. Conversely, consequences that are absurd or otherwise unacceptable are presumed not to have been intended (Rizzo, at para. 27; Wang v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2023 BCCA 101, 480 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at paras. 42-43; see also R. Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation in a New Nutshell” (2003), 82 Can. Bar Rev. 51, at p. 64).
[77] I agree with the carriers that an access regime that applies to wireline equipment in a mobile wireless telecommunications network but not wireless equipment is not the regime most favourable to the deployment of 5G infrastructure, a regime that Parliament could have enacted. It will require them to negotiate with municipalities without recourse to the CRTC. That said, this does not mean the narrower interpretation leads to an absurd result; it is not unreasonable, illogical, incompatible with other provisions of the Act, does not defeat the purpose of the Act, nor does it render any part of the Act pointless or futile (Rizzo, at para. 27).
[78] I am not persuaded that a narrow interpretation of “transmission line” is likely to lead to an absurd consequence of impeding the Act’s overall objectives. There was evidence before the CRTC that delays in accessing public property could run up to two years. But the CRTC found that municipalities or other public authorities have not “systematically” interfered with the deployment of 5G infrastructure (CRTC Decision, at para. 475). This factual finding is entitled to deference. The carriers have failed to establish that regulating access to the wireline and wireless equipment in a network differently would frustrate the orderly deployment of the carriers’ telecommunications infrastructure — 5G or otherwise — across Canada.
[79] Further, in my view, there is no absurdity in the fact that some equipment, such as wire or cables, are subject to the access regime but other equipment, such as antennas are not. As I earlier noted, antennas have specific impacts and risks that are not engaged when carriers install, maintain and operate wires or cables. The access regime, by contrast, has clearly been designed with linear infrastructure in mind. As a result, subjecting all connected infrastructure, including 5G small cell antennas or previous-generation large cell antenna towers to the access regime without regard for these impacts and risks could give rise to concerns about unintended consequences. The same is true even if I draw a distinction between 5G small cell antennas and large cell antennas — they have many of the same impacts and risks, such as frequency interference, exposure safety, etc. . Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue)
In Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue) (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an insolvency appeal, here involving "when a bankrupt is released from their government student loan debts under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act".
Here the court considers the statutory interpretation principle of 'absurdity':[98] Courts should interpret legislation under the presumption that a legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences. An interpretation of a statutory provision produces absurd consequences if, for example, it frustrates the purpose of the legislation; creates irrational distinctions; leads to ridiculous or futile consequences; is extremely unreasonable or unfair; leads to incoherence, contradiction, anomaly, or disproportionate or pointless hardship; undermines the efficient administration of justice; or violates established legal norms such as the rule of law (Rizzo, at para. 27; La Presse, at para. 54; R. v. Basque, 2023 SCC 18, at para. 73; Downes, at para. 51; Sullivan, at §§ 10.02-10.03; Côté and Devinat, at paras. 1514-19). . BNSF Railway Company v. Greater Vancouver Water District
In BNSF Railway Company v. Greater Vancouver Water District (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal [under the Canada Transportation Act, s.41(1)], here from a CTA decision that "found the rerouting works suitable and authorized the District to construct and maintain them at the District’s cost".
Here the court considers the statutory interpretation role of 'absurdity':[133] When legislation is open to more than one interpretation, an interpretation that leads to negative consequences or an absurd result should be rejected: Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., 1995 CanLII 112 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, 24 O.R. (3d) 454 at 1081-1082; Rizzo at para. 27; Porter v. Boucher-Chicago, 2021 FCA 102 at para. 41. An interpretation that is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, illogical or incoherent, or incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment can be absurd: Rizzo at para. 27. . Aviva Insurance Company of Canada v. Danay Suarez
In Aviva Insurance Company of Canada v. Danay Suarez (Div Ct, 2021) the Divisional Court quotes from the leading statutory interpretation case of Rizzo on absurdity:[33] In Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), Iacobucci, J. noted:It is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences. According to Côté, supra, an interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, or if it is incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment (at pp. 378-80). Sullivan echoes these comments noting that a label of absurdity can be attached to interpretations which defeat the purpose of a statute or render some aspect of it pointless or futile (Sullivan, Construction of Statutes, supra, at p. 88). (para. 27)
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