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Statutory Interpretation - "Autonomy". Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia
In Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada establishes of a new tort of 'Intimate Partner Violence'.
The court considers the concept of 'autonomy', here as an underpinning policy factor for this new tort:[129] The importance of autonomy to one’s dignity is well established in the law. In R. v. Morgentaler, 1988 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at p. 166, Wilson J., concurring, held that “an aspect of the respect for human dignity on which the Charter is founded is the right to make fundamental personal decisions without interference from the state”. Likewise, scholars have connected interference with a person’s autonomy with disregard for their moral worth, and thus with the violation of their dignity (Réaume, at pp. 84-85; see also Sugarman and Boucher, at p. 105). The right to make meaningful decisions about one’s life is inseparable from one’s equal standing in relation to others. A denial of autonomy is not only a failure to respect the individual’s dignity — it is a mode of unequal treatment that denies their agency, voice, and status.
[130] This Court has consistently cited autonomy as an important interest protected by law (see, e.g., Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, at para. 62; Godbout v. Longueuil (City), 1997 CanLII 335 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844, at para. 66). It has also provided clear guidance confirming the view that autonomy protects the ability to make fundamental choices. Discussing the “sphere of autonomy” protected by s. 5 of Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, the Court held that it includes “the right to take fundamentally personal decisions free from unjustified external interference” (Godbout, at para. 98). Moreover, the Court found that the right to liberty under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter protects “an irreducible sphere of personal autonomy wherein individuals may make inherently private choices free from state interference” (para. 66; see also A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181, at para. 100, citing Morgentaler, at p. 166; B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, 1995 CanLII 115 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at para. 80; Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, at para. 49; Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1993 CanLII 75 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at pp. 587‑88, per Sopinka J. for the majority).
[131] Transposed to the context of private relationships, autonomy refers to the capacity to make fundamental decisions in accordance with one’s values, free from unjustified interference from others (see Nussbaum, at p. 101; see also G. Parchomovsky and A. Stein, “Autonomy” (2021), 71 U.T.L.J. 61, at pp. 62-63 and 65-66). Within a relationship of intimacy and interdependence, autonomy assumes a relational dimension: it is respected, or eroded, in the ways that one partner treats the other (see I.F., Attorney General of British Columbia, at para. 21). It calls on the notion that even when a person is a participant to an intimate partnership, they nonetheless retain their personhood and remain free to make their own choices in the pursuit of personal or shared goals and aspirations. It becomes possible only when mutual recognition, freedom of choice, and respect for personal boundaries are maintained. The equal standing of each partner in an intimate relationship is both the precondition for autonomy and the measure of its protection. A spouse’s abusive conduct towards their partner — when that conduct objectively amounts to coercive control in a manner incompatible with these aspects of the intimate partnership — can cause the loss of that personal freedom for the victim of abuse. Moreover, autonomy demands protection against all modes of unjustified coercion that erode one’s ability to make fundamental decisions. When established as a consequence of intentional conduct, that loss of autonomy is harm deserving of compensation.
[132] The deprivation of autonomy within intimate partnerships can flow from the accumulation of subtle acts that might not have the same effect in a different relationship. Intimate partner violence entails a pattern of coercion that can unfold slowly over time, and may or may not be punctuated by incidents of physical or emotional distress (Maur (2023), at pp. 108-10; A. Pilliar, “Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia — Signalling Access or Closing a Door?” (2024), 75 U.N.B.L.J. 119, at p. 123). The victim’s range of action is narrowed, leaving the victim subject to subordination that may persist without further intervention by the abuser (Maur (2023), at pp. 108-10; see also Stark (2023), at pp. 268-69). Intimate partner violence thus operates by undermining the victim’s ability to make meaningful choices about their life. The erosion of the victim’s autonomy in turn constitutes an affront to their dignity. It disregards their intrinsic worth as an individual, and fails to acknowledge them as equals worthy of respect within the intimate partnership. The wrong is not only the breach of autonomy or dignity in isolation, but the collapse of the shared normative foundation — dignity, autonomy, and equality — on which intimate partnerships are meant to rest.
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