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Statutory Interpretation - "Dignity". Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia
In Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada establishes of a new tort of 'Intimate Partner Violence'.
The court considers the concept of 'dignity', here as an underpinning policy factor for this new tort:[128] In its most widely accepted definition, dignity refers to the respect that a person deserves because of their intrinsic worth as an individual. It is predicated on the view that everyone has equal value simply by virtue of being human (see M. C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (2000), at p. 243; D. G. Réaume, “Indignities: Making a Place for Dignity in Modern Legal Thought” (2002), 28 Queen’s L.J. 61, at pp. 80-81; Sugarman and Boucher, at pp. 101-5; Bayefsky, at pp. 3-26; C. Brunelle, “La dignité dans la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne: de l’ubiquité à l’ambiguïté d’une notion fondamentale”, [2006] R. du B. (numéro thématique) 143, at p. 168). In Ward v. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse), 2021 SCC 43, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 176, at para. 58, the Court interpreted dignity to mean “protection from the denial of [one’s] worth as a human being”, and held that “[w]here a person is stripped of their humanity by being subjected to treatment that debases, subjugates, objectifies, humiliates or degrades them, there is no question that their dignity is violated”. Dignity requires respect for the “fundamental attributes” everyone equally possesses simply by virtue of being human (Quebec (Public Curator) v. Syndicat national des employés de l’hôpital St-Ferdinand, 1996 CanLII 172 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 211, at para. 105). The Court further affirmed that human dignity is the “lodestar” that guides all Charter rights (R. v. Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, at para. 21; see also para. 22). As Martin J., then a professor of law, explained, “human dignity is a composite notion” (S. Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001), 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299, at p. 329). From that composite, the common law of torts recognizes different rights and interests worthy of legal protection (see K. S. Abraham and G. E. White, “The Puzzle of the Dignitary Torts” (2019), 104 Cornell L. Rev. 317; M. I. Hall, “Beyond the King’s Peace: Direct Interferences With the Person as Tortious Interferences with Autonomy” (2024), 3 S.C.L.R. (3d) 153; Réaume, at pp. 64-65), thus reflecting how Canadian society believes one ought to be treated.
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