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Statutory Interpretation - Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius (Implied Exclusion)This well-known principle of statutory interpretation, 'implied exclusion' or expressio unius est exclusio alterius, may apply when a condition is expressly applied to one situation but not the second. The idea is that when a statute expressly addresses the condition in one case, that it's absence in the second must be intentional.
. Kosicki v. Toronto (City)
In Kosicki v. Toronto (City) (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed a homeowner's appeal, this from an Ontario Court of Appeal ruling that upheld the dismissal of an adverse possession application at the Superior Court, which "sought an order for possessory title to the disputed land".
Here the court states the statutory interpretation doctrine of 'expressio unius est exclusion alterius' (implied exclusion):[39] The maxim of interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“to express one thing is to exclude another”) is also of particular relevance here. An inference of implied exclusion may be drawn where there is an expectation that “if the legislature had meant to include a particular thing within its legislation, it would have referred to that thing expressly” (Sullivan, at § 8.09[1]; see R. v. Wolfe, 2024 SCC 34, at para. 25; Canada v. Loblaw Financial Holdings Inc., 2021 SCC 51, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 687, at para. 59; Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. Canada, 2011 SCC 63, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 721, at para. 108).
[40] In my view, the ordinary language of the provision, which establishes a closed list of exceptions, creates a strong expectation that the legislature would have made express reference to municipal parkland in s. 16 of the RPLA had it intended it to be excepted. I agree with the dissenting judge of the Court of Appeal that it is significant that the provision expressly includes certain municipal property, that is, road allowances or highways that have vested in a municipality, but no others (see para. 101). I also note that s. 16 sets out specific and explicit exceptions to the application of otherwise broadly framed rules barring recovery to “any land” of “any person” outside of the limitation period (RPLA, ss. 4 and 15) (see Bishop v. Stevens, 1990 CanLII 75 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467, at pp. 480-81).
[41] I acknowledge that implied exclusion reasoning should not be treated as determinative, as the City argues (R.F., at para. 68). However, it continues to be a relevant tool of interpretation, and, where relevant, its weight will vary when considered in light of contextual factors and the purpose of the scheme (see Sullivan, at § 8.09[5]; Green v. Law Society of Manitoba, 2017 SCC 20, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 360, at para. 37). I am of the view that it carries significant weight in this case, particularly, as I will explain below, since the inference is reinforced by other statutes that exempt certain categories of land from the application of the RPLA. . Westjet v. Lareau
In Westjet v. Lareau (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a Federal Court appeal, this where the "legal question before this Court is the scope of the safety category: when is a flight disruption "“within the carrier’s control but ... required for safety purposes”" under section 11 of the Regulations?"
Here the court considers the 'implied exclusion' rule of statutory interpretation:[128] The appellant invites this Court to apply the implied exclusion rule of statutory interpretation. It argues that because subsections 10(2) and 11(2) expressly impose on carriers a duty to take all reasonable measures to mitigate the impact of a disruption, the drafter of the Regulations did not intend a similar duty in any other situation. Therefore, it submits that the Regulations cannot be read as requiring a carrier that seeks to categorize a disruption within its control as required for safety purposes to show that it took reasonable measures to mitigate the impact of the disruption.
[129] Courts do consider rules of statutory interpretation, including the implied exclusion rule, when they apply the modern principle of statutory interpretation: Piekut at para. 47. However, an argument based on implied exclusion is purely textual in nature and cannot be the sole basis for interpreting a statute; the words of the statute must be considered in conjunction with its purpose and its scheme: Green v. Law Society of Manitoba, 2017 SCC 20, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 360 at para. 37. ... . Fleming v. Massey
However the doctrine has been held to be subject to a more basic principle of statutory interpretation, that of reading the statute in it's entire context: Fleming v. Massey (Ont CA, 2016), para 36-46:[44] Rothstein J. reiterated, at para. 16, that the modern approach to statutory construction is “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”.
[45] Reading the WSIA as a whole, it is apparent its objective is to ensure injured workers have access to compensation. It employs two different means to accomplish that objective. The first means provides workers with an insurance plan and completely eliminates workers’ civil actions. In the part of the Act dealing with the first means, it was necessary to prohibit only the waiver of benefits under the insurance plan. The second means, Part X, makes numerous changes to the common law to achieve the same statutory objective by providing workers with rights of action for damages. It seems to me that applying the implied exclusion principle to s. 16 to infer a worker can waive the rights provided by Part X would fundamentally undermine what the Legislature is trying to achieve in Part X.
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