|
Statutory Interpretation - "Government". CNL Ltd. v. Kebaowek First Nation et al.
In CNL Ltd. v. Kebaowek First Nation et al. (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal allowed an appeal (from a JR), this over whether the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission "erred in failing to consider the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) standard as stipulated therein in relation to the approval" of "the proposed near surface disposal facility (NSDF) on the Chalk River Laboratories site (the Site) that would be used to store low-level radioactive waste (LLW)".
Here the court considers the statutory interpretation issue of the meaning of the 'Government of Canada':C. Is the Commission the Government of Canada for the purposes of section 5 of the UNDA?
[83] Even though the UNDA does not immediately implement all the articles of UNDRIP, section 5 of the UNDA stipulates that the "“Government of Canada must, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples, take all measures necessary to ensure that the laws of Canada are consistent with the Declaration”". In this appeal, it is not necessary to find an all-inclusive definition of "“Government of Canada”". The only issue that is before us is whether the Commission, when it is acting in its administrative capacity to approve the construction of the NSDF, is included in the term "“Government of Canada”" as this expression is used in section 5 of the UNDA and, therefore, would be obligated to undertake the consultation process and to take the necessary measures as contemplated by this section. In my view, the reference to the "“Government of Canada”" in section 5 of the UNDA does not include the Commission, when it is so acting.
[84] There is no definition of "“government”" in the UNDA or in the federal Interpretation Act.
[85] The term "“Government of Canada”" is used in several of the recitals of the UNDA:"Preamble"
"Attendu :"
"…"
"[…]"
"Whereas the Government of Canada rejects all forms of colonialism and is committed to advancing relations with Indigenous peoples that are based on good faith and on the principles of justice, democracy, equality, non-discrimination, good governance and respect for human rights;"
"que le gouvernement du Canada rejette toute forme de colonialisme et s’est engagé à promouvoir des relations avec les peuples autochtones qui soient fondées sur la bonne foi et sur les principes de justice, de démocratie, d’égalité, de non-discrimination, de bonne gouvernance et de respect des droits de la personne;"
"…"
"[…]"
"Whereas the Government of Canada recognizes that all relations with Indigenous peoples must be based on the recognition and implementation of the inherent right to self-determination, including the right of self-government;"
"que le gouvernement du Canada reconnaît que les relations avec les peuples autochtones doivent être fondées sur la reconnaissance et la mise en œuvre du droit inhérent à l’autodétermination, y compris le droit à l’autonomie gouvernementale;"
"Whereas the Government of Canada is committed to taking effective measures — including legislative, policy and administrative measures — at the national and international level, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples, to achieve the objectives of the Declaration;"
"que le gouvernement du Canada est déterminé à prendre des mesures efficaces — d’ordre législatif, politique et administratif, entre autres — à l’échelle nationale et internationale, en consultation et en collaboration avec les peuples autochtones, afin d’atteindre les objectifs de la Déclaration;"
"Whereas the Government of Canada is committed to exploring, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples, measures related to monitoring, oversight, recourse or remedy or other accountability measures that will contribute to the achievement of those objectives;"
"que le gouvernement du Canada s’engage à explorer, en consultation et en collaboration avec les peuples autochtones, des mesures de contrôle ou de surveillance, des voies de recours, des mesures de réparation ou d’autres mesures de reddition de comptes qui contribueront à l’atteinte de ces objectifs;"
"…"
"[…]"
"Whereas the Government of Canada acknowledges that provincial, territorial and municipal governments each have the ability to establish their own approaches to contributing to the implementation of the Declaration by taking various measures that fall within their authority;"
"que le gouvernement du Canada reconnaît que les gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux et les administrations municipales ont chacun la faculté d’établir leurs propres façons de contribuer à la mise en œuvre de la Déclaration en adoptant, à cette fin, diverses mesures relevant de leur compétence;"
"Whereas the Government of Canada welcomes opportunities to work cooperatively with those governments, Indigenous peoples and other sectors of society towards achieving the objectives of the Declaration;"
"que le gouvernement du Canada est prêt à saisir les occasions de travailler en collaboration avec ces gouvernements et ces administrations, les peuples autochtones et d’autres acteurs de la société pour atteindre les objectifs de la Déclaration;"
"[Emphasis added]"
"[Non souligné dans l’original]" [86] It is not clear from the use of the term "“Government of Canada”" in the recitals whether the reference in section 5 of the UNDA would include the Commission. While there is a reference to the Government of Canada taking administrative measures, which could suggest that the Commission could take administrative measures, there is also a reference to the Government of Canada acknowledging that other levels of government (provincial, territorial and municipal) will have different approaches and to the Government of Canada working with these other levels of government, which would suggest that the Commission may not be included as the Government of Canada for the purpose of resolving inconsistencies between UNDRIP and the existing laws of Canada. The objects of the Commission, as set out below, are limited to issues related to nuclear energy and nuclear substances. It is far from clear what other levels of government would also deal with nuclear energy and nuclear substances or why the Commission would be tasked with working with provincial, territorial and municipal governments who may be dealing with the storage or disposal of other hazardous materials.
[87] Kebaowek, in paragraph 77 of its memorandum, submits that:77. The term “Government of Canada” is not synonymous with “the Parliament of Canada” and, more generally, is understood to mean the executive. Section 8 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides “[t]he Executive Government and Authority of and over Canada is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the Queen.” Thereafter references to the “Government of Canada” in Canada’s Constitution occur under Part III dealing with executive power rather than under Part IV, which addresses the legislative power of Parliament. Understood in accordance with its plain language, the Commission would clearly fall within the definition of the “Government of Canada” as: (1) it clearly exercises executive powers granted under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, (2) it has been expressly constituted as a Crown agent, and (3) it falls with the broad understanding of the Crown adopted in the Clyde River case. [88] Although Kebaowek states that the term "“Government of Canada”" appears in Part III of the Constitution Act, 1867, Kebaowek does not cite the particular references to this term. The term "“Government of Canada”" is used in four sections of Part III of the Constitution Act, 1867:"10 The Provisions of this Act referring to the Governor General extend and apply to the Governor General for the Time being of Canada, or other the Chief Executive Officer or Administrator for the Time being carrying on the Government of Canada on behalf and in the Name of the Queen, by whatever Title he is designated."
"10 ""Les dispositions de la présente loi relatives au gouverneur général s’étendent et s’appliquent au gouverneur général du Canada, ou à tout autre Chef Exécutif ou Administrateur pour le temps d’alors, administrant le gouvernement du Canada au nom de la Reine, quel que soit le titre sous lequel il puisse être désigné."
"11 There shall be a Council to aid and advise in the Government of Canada, to be styled the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada; and the Persons who are to be Members of that Council shall be from Time to Time chosen and summoned by the Governor General and sworn in as Privy Councillors, and Members thereof may be from Time to Time removed by the Governor General."
"11"" Il y aura, pour aider et aviser, dans l’administration du gouvernement du Canada, un conseil dénommé le Conseil Privé de la Reine pour le Canada; les personnes qui formeront partie de ce conseil seront, de temps à autre, choisies et mandées par le Gouverneur-Général et assermentées comme Conseillers Privés; les membres de ce conseil pourront, de temps à autre, être révoqués par le gouverneur-général."
"12 All Powers, Authorities, and Functions which under any Act of the Parliament of Great Britain, or of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or of the Legislature of Upper Canada, Lower Canada, Canada, Nova Scotia, or New Brunswick, are at the Union vested in or exerciseable by the respective Governors or Lieutenant Governors of those Provinces, with the Advice, or with the Advice and Consent, of the respective Executive Councils thereof, or in conjunction with those Councils, or with any Number of Members thereof, or by those Governors or Lieutenant Governors individually, shall, as far as the same continue in existence and capable of being exercised after the Union in relation to the Government of Canada, be vested in and exerciseable by the Governor General, with the Advice or with the Advice and Consent of or in conjunction with the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, or any Members thereof, or by the Governor General individually, as the Case requires, subject nevertheless (except with respect to such as exist under Acts of the Parliament of Great Britain or of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland) to be abolished or altered by the Parliament of Canada."
"12"" Tous les pouvoirs, attributions et fonctions qui, — par une loi du parlement de la Grande-Bretagne, ou du parlement du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande, ou de la législature du Haut-Canada, du Bas-Canada, du Canada, de la Nouvelle-Écosse ou du Nouveau-Brunswick, lors de l’union, — sont conférés aux gouverneurs ou lieutenants-gouverneurs respectifs de ces provinces ou peuvent être par eux exercés, de l’avis ou de l’avis et du consentement des conseils exécutifs de ces provinces, ou avec la coopération de ces conseils, ou d’aucun nombre de membres de ces conseils, ou par ces gouverneurs ou lieutenants-gouverneurs individuellement, seront, — en tant qu’ils continueront d’exister et qu’ils pourront être exercés, après l’union, relativement au gouvernement du Canada, — conférés au gouverneur-général et pourront être par lui exercés, de l’avis ou de l’avis et du consentement ou avec la coopération du Conseil Privé de la Reine pour le Canada ou d’aucun de ses membres, ou par le gouverneur-général individuellement, selon le cas; mais ils pourront, néanmoins (sauf ceux existant en vertu de lois de la Grande-Bretagne ou du parlement du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande), être révoqués ou modifiés par le parlement du Canada."
"…"
"[…]"
"16 Until the Queen otherwise directs, the Seat of Government of Canada shall be Ottawa."
"16 ""Jusqu’à ce qu’il plaise à la Reine d’en ordonner autrement, Ottawa sera le siège du gouvernement du Canada."
"[Emphasis added]"
"[Non souligné dans l’original]" [89] None of these uses of the term "“Government of Canada”" would necessarily lead to a conclusion that the reference to the "“Government of Canada”" in section 5 of the UNDA would include the Commission.
[90] Kebaowek also states that the Commission "“clearly exercises executive powers granted under the ""Nuclear Safety and Control Act”". Kebaowek, however, does not identify what executive powers are granted to the Commission. It does not necessarily follow that even though the Commission may exercise executive powers, the Commission would be the "“Government of Canada”" for the purposes of section 5 of the UNDA in deciding whether to approve the NSDF project.
[91] Kebaowek also refers to the designation of the Commission as an agent of the Crown (subsection 8(2) of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, S.C. 1997, c. 9 (the NSCA)) as support for its argument that the Commission is the Government of Canada for the purposes of section 5 of the UNDA:"8 (1) There is hereby established a body corporate to be known as the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission."
"8 (1"") Est constituée une personne morale appelée la Commission canadienne de sûreté nucléaire."
"(2) The Commission is for all its purposes an agent of Her Majesty and may exercise its powers only as an agent of Her Majesty."
"(2)"" La Commission est mandataire de Sa Majesté et ne peut exercer ses attributions qu’à ce titre." [92] The Commission is only designated as an agent of the Crown "“for all its purposes”". There is nothing to indicate that the Commission’s purposes would include undertaking the specific consultation and cooperation process contemplated by section 5 of the UNDA and the taking of the necessary measures as set out in this section.
[93] The objects of the Commission are set out in section 9 of the NSCA:"9 The objects of the Commission are"
"9 ""La Commission a pour mission :"
"(a) to regulate the development, production and use of nuclear energy and the production, possession and use of nuclear substances, prescribed equipment and prescribed information in order to"
"a)"" de réglementer le développement, la production et l’utilisation de l’énergie nucléaire ainsi que la production, la possession et l’utilisation des substances nucléaires, de l’équipement réglementé et des renseignements réglementés afin que :"
"(i) prevent unreasonable risk, to the environment and to the health and safety of persons, associated with that development, production, possession or use,"
"(i)"" le niveau de risque inhérent à ces activités tant pour la santé et la sécurité des personnes que pour l’environnement, demeure acceptable,"
"(ii) prevent unreasonable risk to national security associated with that development, production, possession or use, and"
"(ii)"" le niveau de risque inhérent à ces activités pour la sécurité nationale demeure acceptable,"
"(iii) achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to which Canada has agreed; and"
"(iii)"" ces activités soient exercées en conformité avec les mesures de contrôle et les obligations internationales que le Canada a assumées;"
"(b) to disseminate objective scientific, technical and regulatory information to the public concerning the activities of the Commission and the effects, on the environment and on the health and safety of persons, of the development, production, possession and use referred to in paragraph (a)."
"b)"" d’informer objectivement le public — sur les plans scientifique ou technique ou en ce qui concerne la réglementation du domaine de l’énergie nucléaire — sur ses activités et sur les conséquences, pour la santé et la sécurité des personnes et pour l’environnement, des activités mentionnées à l’alinéa a)." [94] The objects of the Commission are limited to issues related to nuclear energy and nuclear substances. The Commission’s objects do not include the regulation of other materials that would be hazardous materials.
[95] Article 29(2) of UNDRIP refers to "“hazardous materials”", which is not defined in UNDRIP. Presumably nuclear waste would not be the only hazardous material for the purposes of Article 29(2) of UNDRIP. Since the Commission’s objects are limited to nuclear substances, this would suggest that Parliament in adopting the UNDA did not intend that the Commission would be tasked with the obligation to consult with Indigenous peoples generally and to take measures to reconcile any inconsistency between Article 29(2) and the laws of Canada with respect to the storage or disposal of "“hazardous materials”", in deciding whether to approve the NSDF project.
[96] The objects of the Commission do not include a broad objective of consultation with Indigenous peoples and the taking of measures to reconcile an inconsistency between the laws of Canada and UNDRIP that could impact, not only the storage or disposal of nuclear waste, but also the storage or disposal of any other material that will be included in the term "“hazardous material”" as it appears in Article 29. The only issue before the Commission was whether the CNL’s licence should be amended to authorize the construction of the proposed NSDF project at the Site, which required consultation and accommodation with a limited number of Indigenous Nations and communities. Section 5 of the UNDA contemplates a general consultation process with Indigenous peoples and taking measures to ensure that the laws of Canada are consistent with UNDRIP.
[97] Kebaowek also refers to "“the broad understanding of the Crown adopted in the ""Clyde River case”" at paragraph 29. In Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., 2017 SCC 40, the Supreme Court stated:[29] By this understanding, the NEB [National Energy Board] is not, strictly speaking, ‘the Crown’. Nor is it, strictly speaking, an agent of the Crown, since — as the NEB operates independently of the Crown’s ministers — no relationship of control exists between them (Hogg, Monahan and Wright, at p. 465). As a statutory body holding responsibility under s. 5(1)(b) of COGOA [Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-7] however, the NEB acts on behalf of the Crown when making a final decision on a project application. Put plainly, once it is accepted that a regulatory agency exists to exercise executive power as authorized by legislatures, any distinction between its actions and Crown action quickly falls away. In this context, the NEB is the vehicle through which the Crown acts. Hence this Court’s interchangeable references in Carrier Sekani [Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43] to “government action” and “Crown conduct” (paras. 42-44). It therefore does not matter whether the final decision maker on a resource project is Cabinet or the NEB. In either case, the decision constitutes Crown action that may trigger the duty to consult. As Rennie J.A. said in dissent at the Federal Court of Appeal in Chippewas of the Thames [Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc., 2015 FCA 222], “[t]he duty, like the honour of the Crown, does not evaporate simply because a final decision has been made by a tribunal established by Parliament, as opposed to Cabinet” (para. 105). The action of the NEB, taken in furtherance of its statutory powers under s. 5(1)(b) of COGOA to make final decisions respecting such testing as was proposed here, clearly constitutes Crown action. [98] The references to the action of the NEB constituting Crown action do not assist in determining whether the Commission, in deciding whether to approve the NSDF project, is the "“Government of Canada”" for the purposes of section 5 of the UNDA. Even though the action of the Commission in approving the NSDF project would be Crown action, it does not necessarily follow that the Commission is the "“Government of Canada”" for the purposes of section 5 of the UNDA.
[99] The term "“Government of Canada”" appears in several other federal statutes, including:. subsections 59(2), (3), and (4), sections 60 and 70, subsections 73(1), (2), 74(1), and (2), section 75, and subsections 77(1), 78(1), and (2) of the Northwest Territories Act, S.C. 2014, c. 2, s. 2;
. subsection 2.1(1), section 2.3, subsection 3(1), section 8, subsections 10(1), (2), and 16(3), section 16.1, subsections 25(3), 39(1), (2), 41(1), (2), (3), (4), and 42(1), section 42.1, and subsections 43(1), 44.1(2), 45.1(1), and 46(1) of the Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.);
. sections 2 and 3 of the Federal Framework for Suicide Prevention Act, S.C. 2012, c. 30;
. subsections 2(1), (1.1), 3(1), 6(1), 44(3.1), 75(2), 207(1), 208(2), 209(3), and 316(1) of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33;
. subsection 3(1), sections 5 and 6, subsections 10(1) and 14(1), section 15 and 16, subsection 19(2), and section 20 of the Department of Public Works and Government Services Act, S.C. 1996, c. 16;
. subsections 2(1), 3.9(1), 7(1), (2), 7.1(1), and 7.4(2), section 7.5, subsections 8.3(1), (2), 8.8(1), (2), 8.9(1), and (2), and sections 28 and 42 of the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-8;
. section 2 and subsections 3(1) and (2) of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 24 (4th Supp.); and
. sections 14 and 40.1, subsection 42(4), sections 42.5 and 145, and subsections 159(2) and (3) of the Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11. [100] A review of the term "“Government of Canada”" as it appears in these various statutes does not reveal a single common meaning to the term. Rather, the meaning to be assigned to "“Government of Canada”" is to be determined based on the context in which it is used in a particular statute.
[101] In my view, given the narrow scope of the objects of the Commission and the broad consultation process envisioned by section 5 of the UNDA, the reference to the Government of Canada in section 5 of the UNDA would not include the Commission in deciding whether to approve the construction of the NSDF.
[102] At the hearing of this appeal, Kebaowek also referred to the obligation on the Commission "“to implement international obligations to which Canada has agreed”" in subsection 24(4) of the NSCA:"(4) No licence shall be issued, renewed, amended or replaced — and no authorization to transfer one given — unless, in the opinion of the Commission, the applicant or, in the case of an application for an authorization to transfer the licence, the transferee"
"(4)"" La Commission ne délivre, ne renouvelle, ne modifie ou ne remplace une licence ou un permis ou n’en autorise le transfert que si elle est d’avis que l’auteur de la demande ou, s’il s’agit d’une demande d’autorisation de transfert, le cessionnaire, à la fois :"
"(a) is qualified to carry on the activity that the licence will authorize the licensee to carry on; and"
"a)"" est compétent pour exercer les activités visées par la licence ou le permis;"
"(b) will, in carrying on that activity, make adequate provision for the protection of the environment, the health and safety of persons and the maintenance of national security and measures required to implement international obligations to which Canada has agreed."
"b)"" prendra, dans le cadre de ces activités, les mesures voulues pour préserver la santé et la sécurité des personnes, pour protéger l’environnement, pour maintenir la sécurité nationale et pour respecter les obligations internationales que le Canada a assumées."
"[Emphasis added]"
"[Non souligné dans l’original]" [103] As noted by the Supreme Court in First Nations Families Act Reference, at paragraph 4, UNDRIP "“is not binding as a treaty in Canada”" and therefore, as a UN general assembly resolution, would not be an international obligation to which Canada has agreed. Furthermore, since the UNDA did not immediately implement the articles of UNDRIP into Canadian law and since the Commission is not the Government of Canada for the purposes of resolving any inconsistency between UNDRIP and the laws of Canada, there is no obligation on the Commission to implement UNDRIP in the course of deciding whether to approve the construction of the NSDF. . Dickson v. Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation
In Dickson v. Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation (SCC, 2024) the Supreme Court of Canada considered the relation of aboriginal rights and the Charter (here s.15 discrimination), focussing primarily on Charter s.25 ['Aboriginal rights and freedoms not affected by Charter'].
Here the court considers whether the VN First Nation constitutes a 'government', to determine whether the Charter applies to it under Charter s.32 ['Application']:[77] On the other hand, in our view the Charter applies to the VGFN’s residency requirement under its Constitution because the VGFN is “government” by nature. Recall that in Godbout, La Forest J. stated that although there can be no a priori list of factors that determines whether an entity performs “governmental” functions (para. 49), an entity may be considered to be government by nature when it has four features (para. 51). The four features are neither necessary nor determinative for an entity to be found to be government by nature but serve as useful indicia of government (para. 51):1. The entity has a council that is “democratically elected by members of the general public and [is] accountable to [its] constituents in a manner analogous to that in which Parliament and the provincial legislatures are accountable to the electorates they represent”.
2. It has “a general taxing power that, for the purposes of determining whether [it] can rightfully be described as ‘government’, is indistinguishable from the taxing powers of Parliament or the provinces”.
3. Importantly, it is empowered to make, administer, and enforce coercive laws binding on the public within a defined territorial jurisdiction, which is a quintessentially governmental function.
4. Most significantly, it derives its existence and lawmaking authority from the federal or provincial government; that is, it exercises powers conferred by Parliament or by a provincial legislature, powers and functions that the federal or provincial government would otherwise have to perform itself.
|
