Simon's Megalomaniacal Legal Resources

Statutory Interpretation - Modern Principle (3)

. Nexus Solutions Inc. v. Krougly

In Nexus Solutions Inc. v. Krougly (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, here brought against the dismissal of the plaintiff's "s.13(3) of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 (the “Act”), which provides that an employer is the first owner of the copyright in a work created by an employee “in the course of” their employment."

Here the court considers the 'modern' approach to statutory interpretation:

[20] It is well established that the modern approach to statutory interpretation requires that the court examine the words of the provision “‘in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament’”: Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13, 502 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 42, citing Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21.

[21] Thus, the plain meaning of the text alone is rarely determinative, and the statutory interpretation analysis is therefore incomplete “without considering the context, purpose and relevant legal norms”: R. v. Alex, 2017 SCC 37, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 967, at para. 31.

. Cytec Canada Inc. v. The Corporation of the City of Niagara Falls

In Cytec Canada Inc. v. The Corporation of the City of Niagara Falls (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, this brought against "the decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal" which "agreed that Cytec was not a “specified person” within the meaning of s. 1 of the Planning Act and precluded it from proceeding" with appeals.

Here the court reviews basics of modern statutory interpretation:

B. Principles of Statutory Interpretation

[29] The central issue on this appeal is one of statutory interpretation. The principles which a court must apply in interpreting a statutory provision are well established and can be summarized as follows:

. The words of a statutory provision must be considered “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: R. v. Carignan, 2025 SCC 43, at para. 55; Piekut v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13, 502 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 42; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 26; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21; Vavilov, at para. 117.

. The meaning of a provision is determined “by reference to its text, context and purpose, ” although these need not be considered separately or in a formulaic way, as they are often interdependent: Telus Communications Inc. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2025 SCC 15, 502 D.L.R. (4th) 59, at para. 30; Auer v. Auer, 2024 SCC 36, 497 D.L.R. (4th) 381, at para. 64; Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, 498 D.L.R. (4th) 316, at para. 24; Piekut, at para. 43.

. The court’s focus must be on the text of the legislation, which is “the anchor of the interpretative exercise,” but the court must bear in mind that “plain meaning alone is not determinative and a statutory interpretation analysis is incomplete without considering the context, purpose and relevant legal norms”: R. v. Rousselle, 2025 SCC 35, at para. 183; R. v. Alex, 2017 SCC 37, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 967, at para. 31; La Presse inc. v. Québec, 2023 SCC 22, at para. 23; Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse), at para. 24; R. v. Kim, 2025 ONCA 478, 178 O.R. (3d) 266, at para. 32; Piekut, at para. 45.

. “Statutory interpretation is centred on the intent of the legislature at the time of enactment and courts are bound to give effect to that intent”: Telus Communications, at para. 32; Kim, at para. 32.

. In considering the intent of the legislature at the time of the enactment, the court should bear in mind that legislation “shall be interpreted as being remedial”: Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F., s. 64(1); Metrolinx v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1587, 2024 ONSC 1900, 172 O.R. (3d) 457 (Div. Ct.), at para. 54.

....

[31] Although the appellant is correct that proper statutory interpretation requires more than determining the “plain and ordinary construction” of the words used in the provision, as noted earlier, the text is “the anchor of the interpretative exercise”: Rousselle, at para. 183; Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse), at para. 24. Because of this, considering the ordinary meaning of the words is a useful starting point, as long as the court goes on to engage in a contextual and purposive analysis to determine whether there is any reason to depart from the ordinary meaning: R. Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes, 7th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2022), at § 3.01; iGaming Ontario (Re), 2025 ONCA 770, at paras. 137-138; Oakville (Town) v. Clublink Corp. ULC, 2019 ONCA 826, 148 O.R. (3d) 513, at para. 44; Belwood Lake Cottagers Assn. Inc. v. Ontario (Ministry of the Environment), 2019 ONCA 70, 431 D.L.R. (4th) 218, at para. 41.