Simon's Megalomaniacal Legal Resources

Statutory Interpretation - Modern Principle - "Purpose"

. R. v. Carignan

In R. v. Carignan (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed a Crown appeal, here brought against a Quebec CA decision that found that "the interpretation of s. 495(2) and (3) [SS: 'Arrest without warrant by peace officer - (2) Limitation and (3) Consequences of arrest without warrant'] Cr. C. adopted by the trial judge was incorrect".

Here, in a statutory interpretation exercise, the court notes that 'purpose' is to be assessed at the time of the provision's enactment:

[56] In this case, the wording of the provisions to be interpreted concerning the power of arrest without warrant came into force nearly a decade before the enactment of the Charter, which introduced new safeguards in relation to arrest. In this context, it is important to remember that the statutory interpretation exercise is focused “on the intent of the legislature at the time of enactment and courts are bound to give effect to that intent” (Telus Communications Inc. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2025 SCC 15, at para. 32 (emphasis added); see also paras. 33‑36; Perka v. The Queen, 1984 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, at pp. 264‑66; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 1985 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at p. 335; United States of America v. Dynar, 1997 CanLII 359 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462, at para. 45; P.‑A. Côté and M. Devinat, Interprétation des lois (5th ed. 2021), at para. 24; R. Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes (7th ed. 2022), at § 6.01[1]).

....

[101] I continue my analysis by focusing on the purpose of the provision. It is well settled that a court engaged in statutory interpretation is not required to follow any strict order in examining the text, context and purpose (Piekut, at para. 43; Bell ExpressVu, at para. 31; Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, at para. 28). Here, this means that there is no obstacle to considering the purpose next in the analysis, and I will look at the context later. ....

. Reference re iGaming Ontario

In Reference re iGaming Ontario (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered a 'reference' [under CJA 8 'References to Court of Appeal'] regarding whether "legal online gaming and sports betting [would] remain lawful under the Criminal Code if its users were permitted to participate in games and betting involving individuals outside of Canada".

Here the court considers the 'purpose' element of the statutory interpretation test:

[141] A purposive analysis favours interpretations that advance the statute’s objectives. “[I]n so far as the language of the text permits, interpretations that are consistent with or promote legislative purpose should be adopted, while interpretations that defeat or undermine legislative purpose should be avoided”: British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 795, at para. 50.

[142] The courts must maintain a clear focus on identifying and giving effect to the intention of Parliament. They are not to wade into a policy debate: Great Canadian Casino Company Ltd. v. Surrey (City) et al, 1999 BCCA 619, 71 B.C.L.R. (3d) 199, at para. 1. The Modern Principle “does not … give judges licence to substitute their policy preferences for those of Parliament”: Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 37, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20, at para. 3, per Rothstein J.

. Ajax (Town) v. Medallion Devels. (Bayly Square) A Ltd.

In (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed a municipal appeal (brought with leave), this against "a decision of the Assessment Review Board (“ARB”), varying the classification applied by the respondent MPAC to the Medallion Respondents’ multi-unit rental residential properties".

Here the court considers what the SCC characterizes as 'confusion' in the 'modern approach' to statutory interpretation, in a quote from La Presse v Quebec (SCC, 2023):

[9] The “modern approach to statutory interpretation” was described by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, para. 26, adopting Professor Driedger’s language, as follows:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

[10] This approach has been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada as recently as 2023, as follows (La Presse Inc. v. Quebec, 2023 SCC 22, paras. 22-24):

It is well established that, under the modern approach to statutory interpretation, “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object 2023 SCC 22 (CanLII) of the Act, and the intention of Parliament” (E. A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87). Confusion as to what this might entail in practice endures, despite the apparent simplicity of Driedger’s influential words. For the sake of clarity, I will restate two principles that seem to be at the heart of this confusion.

First, the plain meaning of the text is not in itself determinative and must be tested against the other indicators of legislative meaning — context, purpose, and relevant legal norms (R. v. Alex, 2017 SCC 37, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 967, at para. 31). The apparent clarity of the words taken separately does not suffice because they “may in fact prove to be ambiguous once placed in their context. The possibility of the context revealing a latent ambiguity such as this is a logical result of the modern approach to interpretation” (Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., 2005 SCC 62, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141, at para. 10).

Second, a provision is only “ambiguous” in the sense contemplated in Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, if its words can reasonably be interpreted in more than one way after due consideration of the context in which they appear and of the purpose of the provision (paras. 29-30). This is to say that there is a “real” ambiguity — one that calls for the use of external interpretive aids like the principle of strict construction of penal laws or the presumption of conformity with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — only if differing readings of the same provision cannot be decisively resolved through the contextual and purposive approach set out by Driedger (ibid.).

. Canadian National Railway Company v. Canada (Transportation Agency)

In Canadian National Railway Company v. Canada (Transportation Agency) (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal (Stratas JA) allowed an appeal, this against a "Canadian Transportation Agency’s rates-setting decision" regarding 'interswitching'.

Here the court considers 'purpose' as a statutory interpretation factor:

[29] ... when interpreting statutes, we must consider purpose as well: Piekut at paras. 44-45; ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140 at para. 48; Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., 2005 SCC 62, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141 at para. 10. In this Court, see also CIBC World Markets Inc. v. Canada, 2019 FCA 147 at para. 27 and Hillier v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 44 at para. 24. The meaning of words seen in their context is one thing; but sometimes their meaning becomes less clear or is altered when we consider general or section-specific purposes in the Act.