Simon's Megalomaniacal Legal Resources

Statutory Interpretation - Modern Principle - "Text"

. R. v. Carignan

In R. v. Carignan (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed a Crown appeal, here brought against a Quebec CA decision that found that "the interpretation of s. 495(2) and (3) [SS: 'Arrest without warrant by peace officer - (2) Limitation and (3) Consequences of arrest without warrant'] Cr. C. adopted by the trial judge was incorrect".

Here the case considers the 'text' element of the modern principle of statutory interpretation:

[58] As I indicated at the outset, the modern approach to statutory interpretation makes the text the “anchor of the interpretative exercise”, because the text specifies the means chosen by Parliament to achieve its purposes and attain its goals (Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13, at para. 45, quoting Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, at para. 24).

. Clouthier v. Co-Operators General Insurance

In Clouthier v. Co-Operators General Insurance (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed an appeal, this brought against a LAT finding that the appellant was not entitled to non-earner benefit at the 'retroactive' date she claimed, here where lateness in filing the claim [under Reg.34/10 (SABS) - s.34 'Result if fail to comply with time limits' and s.36 'Claim for Income Replacement Benefit, Non-Earner Benefit, Caregiver Benefit or Payment for Housekeeping or Home Maintenance Services'] was due to her temporary incapacity stemming from the accident.

Here the court emphasizes the 'text' element of the modern principle of statutory interpretation, and notes that the same test applies to administrative law and to courts:

The Approach to Statutory Interpretation

[34] The modern rule of statutory interpretation requires that the words of a statute be read “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21, citing Elmer A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at p. 87; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 29.

[35] The goal of the interpretive exercise “is to find harmony between the words of the statute and the intended object”: R. v. Breault, 2023 SCC 9, 481 D.L.R. (4th) 195, at para. 26, quoting MediaQMI Inc. v. Kamel, 2021 SCC 23, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 899, at para. 39.

[36] That recognized, the text’s ordinary meaning must still anchor the interpretative exercise: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, 498 D.L.R. (4th) 316, at para. 24.

[37] This approach applies whether the entity interpreting the law is a court or an administrative decision maker: Vavilov, at para. 118.

[38] Recently, the Court of Appeal for Ontario summarized this well-known approach to statutory interpretation in Reference re iGaming Ontario, 2025 ONCA 770, at paras. 135-142.

. Reference re iGaming Ontario

In Reference re iGaming Ontario (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered a 'reference' [under CJA 8 'References to Court of Appeal'] regarding whether "legal online gaming and sports betting [would] remain lawful under the Criminal Code if its users were permitted to participate in games and betting involving individuals outside of Canada".

Here the court considers the 'text' element of the statutory interpretation test:

1. Text and ordinary meaning

[137] Statutory interpretation must always begin by paying close attention “to the text of the statute, which remains the anchor of the interpretive exercise”: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, 498 D.L.R. (4th) 316, at para. 24. That is because it is through the text that the legislature seeks to achieve its purpose: Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse, at para. 24; MediaQMI inc. v. Kamel, 2021 SCC 23, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 899, at para. 39.

[138] Accordingly, the text’s ordinary meaning is the starting point of statutory interpretation. Ordinary meaning “[m]ost often … refers ‘to the reader’s first impression meaning, the understanding that spontaneously emerges when words are read in their immediate context’”: Pharmascience Inc. v. Binet, 2006 SCC 48, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 513, at para. 30. The ordinary meaning is generally presumed to reflect the intention of the legislature, and it plays a dominant role where it is precise and unequivocal: Belwood Lake Cottagers Association Inc. v. Ontario (Environment and Climate Change), 2019 ONCA 70, 431 D.L.R. (4th) 318, at paras. 40-42; Canada v. Loblaw Financial Holdings Inc., 2021 SCC 51, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 687, at para. 41.

. Grenon v. Canada

In Grenon v. Canada (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal considered the 'text' element of the modern statutory interpretation test of 'text, context, purpose':

(a) Text

[138] The Supreme Court of Canada recently reminded us that "“[t]he starting point in any interpretive exercise is the text of the provision”" and that "“[i]n the absence of statutory definitions, what should be focused on is the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the text, that is, ‘the natural meaning’ that appears when the provision is simply read through as a whole”": Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, 498 D.L.R. (4th) 316 at paras. 23, 28 [CISSS A].