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Statutory Interpretation - Strictest Right (Strictissimi Juris). Viterra Canada Inc. v. Grain Workers' Union (International Longshoreman’s Warehousemen’s Union, Local 333)
In Viterra Canada Inc. v. Grain Workers' Union (International Longshoreman’s Warehousemen’s Union, Local 333) (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal considered seven appeals, all relating to "a dispute between the parties that dates from 2017 when Grain Workers’ Union Local 333 ILWU (the Union) filed two policy grievances alleging violation by Viterra Canada Inc. (Viterra) of the maximum work hours provisions of the Canada Labour Code".
Here the court considers the doctrine of strictissimi juris ['strictest right'], here in a contempt context:[26] The scope of the doctrine of strictissimi juris is a determination of law reviewable for correctness while the application of the doctrine is reviewed for palpable and overriding error: Housen at paras. 8, 33.
[27] I agree with Viterra that contempt proceedings require strict compliance with procedural steps and formalities due to the potential impact on the person alleged to be in contempt, up to and including imprisonment: Beniey v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2022 FCA 202 at para. 16, citing Orr v. Fort McKay First Nation, 2012 FC 1436 at para. 13; Bassett v. Magee, 2015 BCCA 422 at para. 35 (Bassett). The jurisprudence is unambiguous in this regard.
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[30] The Federal Court recognized in the Preliminary Order that civil contempt is quasi-criminal in nature and acknowledged the application of the doctrine of strictissimi juris to the proceedings before it. The Court stated that the doctrine must be applied such that "“proceedings are carried out with care and close adherence to procedural requirements”", referring to Friedlander at paragraph 26, which in turn relied on Bassett. The Federal Court then stated that the doctrine is not intended to require blind compliance with procedural requirements but "“seeks to ensure the fairness of the contempt process”", a process that is to be a last resort for non-compliance with a court order.
[31] I find no error of law in the Federal Court’s statement that the doctrine of strictissimi juris does not require blind compliance with procedural obligations. The statement far from suggests a standard of mere fairness. Viterra emphasizes the Federal Court’s statement that the doctrine of strictissimi juris "“seeks to ensure the fairness of the contempt process”" but I am not persuaded that this statement reflects the Federal Court’s construction of the doctrine. Read with the Court’s repeated acknowledgement of the criminal nature of contempt proceedings and the requirements of strict - but not blind - compliance and close adherence to procedural requirements, its reference to fairness is explanatory, although not helpful.
[32] Strict compliance, fairness and procedural fairness, though related, are distinct. While the doctrine of strictissimi juris can generally be said to safeguard the fairness of the process, "“fairness”" is not, in my view, an adequate description of the requirements it imposes. The cases consistently emphasize the gravity of a contempt order (Pro Swing at para. 35) and require "“close adherence to procedural requirements: a precision in pleadings, procedure and evidence appropriate to the nature of the process which engages the court in a conflict with one of the parties”": Bassett at para. 5; Beloit Canada Ltd. v. Valmet Oy, [1988] F.C.J. No. 103 at para. 43, 1988 CanLII 10150 (FCA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 20824 (June 30, 1988).
[33] The Federal Court’s finding that strictissimi juris or strict compliance does not require blind compliance is consistent with the jurisprudence. Definitionally, a requirement of strict compliance does not equate to blind compliance. The Federal Court’s "“blind compliance”" standard is, in my view, a different formulation of the same requirement of "“close adherence to procedural requirements”", the formulation used by the B.C. Court of Appeal (BCCA) in Bassett (at para. 35; see also Friedlander at para. 26).
[34] By way of example, this Court has refused to intervene when a show cause order contained a typographical error that was not prejudicial in any way to the person alleged to be in contempt and which was nothing more than a technical defect: Steward v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1988] 3 FC 452 , 1988 CanLII 9395 (FCA). In contrast, in Bassett, the BCCA relied on the presence of prejudice as a significant factor in concluding the procedure followed in a contempt proceeding was not adequate.
[35] The application of the doctrine by the Federal Court informs its reference to blind compliance and gives rise to no palpable and overriding error. The filing deficiency raised by Viterra was clearly a technical error on the part of the Federal Court registry. Viterra does not challenge the Federal Court’s factual finding that the reference to subsection 251.15(1) instead of subsection 66(1) in the Certificate of Filing caused it no prejudice. Viterra’s appeal submissions rely heavily on criminal law cases in which the deviation from procedure in question was substantive but here, the issue raised speaks solely to technical non-compliance. I find that the Federal Court’s refusal to require blind compliance with the registration requirement of section 66 of the Code was fully justified.
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